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ሺETFsሻ  options  on  the  information  related  trading  of  index  options.    Two  option  pairs, 
NASDAQ  100  index  ሺNDXሻ  and  ETF  ሺQQQ,  currently  QQQQሻ  options,  and  Standard  and 
Poor’s 500 index ሺSPXሻ options and S & P Depository Receipts ሺSPYሻ options, are studied.  I 
test the hypothesis, based on the theory of Chowdhry and Nanda ሺ1991ሻ, and Admati and 
Pfleiderer  ሺ1988ሻ,  that  the  information  component  of  spreads  for  index  options  should 
decline after ETF options were introduced.  The method of George, Kaul, and Nimalendran 
ሺ1991ሻ  is  used  to  estimate  the  adverse  selection  proportion  of  log  quoted  spread  and 
revenue from quoted spread.  Primary results show that the adverse selection component 
of  index  options  declines  after  the  introduction  of  ETF  options,  and  that  the  adverse 
selection  component  of  options  on  index  ETFs  is  greater  than  that  of  options  on  index, 
suggesting more informed trading for ETF options.   
The second essay examines whether the liquidity premium decreases as the costs of 
transactions  decline.    Nine  liquidity  measures  are  estimated  to  form  liquidity  deciles 
portfolios.    I  use  several  benchmark  asset  pricing models  in  fixed  and  rolling  36‐month 
samples to estimate time variation liquidity premia.  Surprisingly, the results show that the 
liquidity premium does not monotonically decline over time, and it increases in the period 



















In  terms  of  tradability,  equity  indices  are  not  tradable  while  ETFs  are  traded 
continuously  and  exempt  from  the up‐tick  rule.    Although  index mutual  funds  and  index 






                                                 
1 The asset value of ETFs in the U.S. at the end of 2006  has surpassed $400 billion from $15 billion in early 










greater trading activities than index options  in presence of  informed traders, especially  if 
information  is  short‐lived.    Therefore,  dealers  or  specialists  in  ETF  options  markets 
probably  face  more  adverse  selection  problems.    In  addition,  ETF  options  increase 
competition  facing  dealers/specialists  in  index  options.    Consequently  the  adverse 
selection  component  of  spreads  is  likely  affected.    The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to 
investigate the extent of the adverse selection problem implicit in index versus ETF options.   
My  initial  hypothesis  is  based  on  the  Chowdhry  and  Nanda  ሺ1991ሻ  model.    The 
model  developed  in  their  paper  addresses  the  effect  of  securities  traded  in  multiple 
locations on order  flows of  competing market markers.   The model  suggests  that market 
makers  timely  release  price  information  to  deter  informed  trading  in  each  market.  
Therefore, small liquidity traders will concentrate in the market with lower trading costs, 
which  in  turn  attracts  large  liquidity  traders  and  insiders  to  trade  in  that  market.  
According to Admati and Pfleiderer ሺ1988ሻ, price becomes more informative in the periods 
of concentrated liquidity and informed trading resulting in  less adverse selection costs to 
market  makers.    Given  these  theoretical  arguments,  I  test  the  hypothesis  that  the 
information component of spreads for  index options should decline after ETF options are 
introduced.   
Opposite  to  the  prediction  of  Chowdhry  and Nanda  ሺ1991ሻ model,  it may  also  be 
argued  that,  if  the dollar amount of adverse selection component of  spreads  remains  the 
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same  and  the  competition  forces  dealers/specialists  to  lower  bid‐ask  spreads,  the 
proportion of adverse selection component of spreads should increase.  Market markers in 
index options market, in this case, face proportionally higher adverse selection costs.  Thus, 







the  method  suggested  by  George,  Kaul,  and  Nimalendran  ሺ1991ሻ.    Consistent  with  the 
prediction of the Chowdhry and Nanda’s ሺ1991ሻ model, the results show that the adverse 
selection component of spreads declines  for  index options after  the  introduction of ETFs.  
However, the information component of log quoted spreads for ETF options is higher than 
that  of  log  quoted  spreads  for  index  options.    Exclusive  licensing  agreements  that 
developers  of  indices  sign with  options  exchanges might  explain  the  higher  information 
component.    Options  dealers/specialists  enjoy  exclusive  right  to  trade  index  options  on 
certain  exchanges.    This  allows  dealers  to  raise  order  processing  costs  for  index  option 
traders to compensate for their volume loss subsequent to the introduction of ETF options.  
Thus,  information  related  trading  is deterred,  encouraging  informed  traders  to  switch  to 
ETF options.   
This study contributes to the extant literature in three respects.  First, my literature 
search  indicates  that no academic  study currently exists  that  examines  the  impact of  the 
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introduction  of  ETF  options  on  the  trading  of  index  options.    Second,  estimating  and 
comparing  the  adverse  selection  costs  for  both  options  should  help  us  understand  the 
nature of informed trading after the introduction of ETF options.  Third, this study employs 
a longer time period of daily data than most of the microstructure research that uses short‐
term  time  stamped  data  to  measure  the  adverse  selection  costs.    There  appears  to  be 
nontrivial  measurement  errors  in  estimating  the  information  component3,  and  use  of  a 
longer period might help  to  reduce  the errors.   Additionally,  to  increase  reliability of  the 
estimates,  the  number  of  contracts  analyzed  here  is  greater  than  that  of  related  studies.  
Empirical  evidence  shows  that  the  adverse  selection  component  of  index  option  spreads 
decreases substantially after  the  introduction of ETF options.   This  implies  that  informed 
traders  desire  flexibility  and  tradability, which  in  turn  suggests  that  their  information  is 
short‐lived.   







A  few  studies  compare  similar  securities  with  different  trading  restrictions.    For 
example,  Brenner,  Eldor,  and  Hauser  ሺ2001ሻ  compare  nontradable  options  issued  by  a 
central  bank  with  similar  options  traded  on  the  exchange,  and  find  that  nontradable 
options are priced about 21 percent less than the exchange‐traded options.   




As  another  example,  Brenner,  Courtadon,  Subrahmanyam  ሺ1985ሻ  compare  two 
types of options that are related to the same asset: options on an asset and options on the 
futures  on  the  same  asset.    They  show  that  early  exercise  explains  the  difference  of  the 
value of the two American‐style options.  The value of a call option on the futures contract 
on  the underlying asset  that does not make  interim payment ሺe.g. goldሻ  is smaller  than a 
call on the same underlying asset.  The rationale of this proposition is that the futures price 
decreases as time approaches to maturity date, and it converges to spot price at maturity.  




Trading risk arisen  from  information asymmetry has been studied exhaustively  in 
previous  literature.4   Here  I  concentrate  on  studies  related  to  the  adverse  selection 
component of spreads  in options markets.   Vijh ሺ1990ሻ examines  the CBOE equity option 
market  depth  and  bid‐ask  spreads.    He  regresses  the  difference  between  the  change  of 
quoted option and stock prices on the number of options that are traded in the 5‐minute 
interval across  the most active 20 options on CBOE during March and April  in 1985.   He 
finds  that  the  adverse  selection  half‐spread  is  .15  cents  on  average,  which  is  small 
compared  to  the  average  effective  spread  of  14  cents  for  these  20  equity  options.    The 
evidence indicates a low level of information‐related trading on these 20 of the most active 
options traded on the CBOE.  Investigating the intraday behavior of bid‐ask spreads for 32 
stock  options  on  CBOE  in  the  first  quarter  of  1986,  Chan,  Chung,  and  Johnson  ሺ1995ሻ 





partition  each  trading  into 27  successive 15‐minute  intervals  in  the  regression  equation.  
They  find  that  a  decline  of  bid‐ask  spread  during  the  day,  consistent  with  Madhavan’s 
ሺ1992ሻ  model  that  information  asymmetry  is  partially  resolved  as  investors  become 
informed by observing trade prices.   
Kaul,  Nimalendran,  and  Zhang  ሺ2005ሻ model  the  determinants  of  option  spreads, 
and test for the spread of an option that directly captures the effects of strategic trading by 
informed traders.  All options traded on CBOE in February 1995 are included in the sample, 
and  they  use  George  et  al’s  ሺ1991ሻ  method  to  estimate  adverse  selection  costs  of 
underlying  stocks.    Their  empirical  evidence  shows  that  adverse  selection  component  of 











and  S  &  P  Depository  Receipts  ሺSPYሻ  options.    The  dataset  was  obtained  from  Chicago 
Board  Option  Exchange  ሺCBOEሻ.    It  provides  daily  trading  volume,  open  interest  ሺthe 









Option  NASDAQ 100 Index Option NDX 12/01/1996 ‐ 11/30/2006













SX  for  a  put  option.    Options  with  same  strike  prices,  expiration  dates,  and 
trading  class  symbols  are  classified  as  the  same  option  contracts.    I  eliminate  option 
contracts which mature less than 24 days in our sample.  The variables of interest reported 
in the summary statistics can be grouped  into  four categories:   Spread measures, proxies 
for  revenue  from  spreads,  volume measures,  and  certain  characteristics  of  options.    The 
spread  measures  in  this  study  contain  log  effective  spread  of  Roll  ሺ1984ሻ  measure,  the 
measure  of George, Kaul,  and Nimalendran  ሺ1991ሻ,  and  log  average proportional  quoted 
spread.    Proxies  for market makers’  revenue  from  spreads  include  effective  spreads  and 
quoted  spreads.    Volume measures  are  log  average  daily  dollar  volume  and  log  average 




In  the  category  of  spread  measures,  the  logarithm  of  effective  spread  of  Roll  ሺ1984ሻ 































∧ −= titiiG RDRDS  ..................................................................................................... ሺ2ሻ 


















+= .    tilastaskP ,,  is  the  daily  closing  ask  price,  while  tilastbidP ,,  is  the 
daily closing bid price for option contract  i   on day  t .   







.    Here  I 














































































I  test  the hypothesis  that  the  information component of  spreads  for  index options 
should decline after ETF options were introduced.   The methodology of George, Kaul, and 
Nimalendran  ሺ1991ሻ  is  used  to  estimate  the  information  component  of  spreads  because 
their method is designed for daily data.  George, Kaul, and Nimalendran’s ሺ1991ሻ method is 
described in Appendix A.  I assume that transaction costs possess Cobb‐Douglas production 
functional  form,  and  use  log  transformation  to  estimate  the  information  component  of 
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spread.    The proof  that  the  exponent  of  the  information  component  is  the  relative  share 
ሺrelative to order processing componentሻ of transaction costs is shown in Appendix B.  Also 
the  log  transformation  of  the  proportional  effective  spread  into  the  regression model  is 
derived in the appendix.   
I empirically estimate the following regression model: 





ln  is  the  log  of  proportional  effective  spread  for  option  contract  i  using  either 
Roll  ሺ1984ሻ  measure  ሺas  in  Equation  1ሻ  or  the  measure  of  George  et  al  ሺ1991ሻ  ሺas  in 
Equation  2ሻ,  iTimeD ,  is  the  time  dummy  variable  ሺ 0, =iTimeD for  the  period  before  the 
introduction of ETF options  and  1, =iTimeD for  the period    after  the  introduction of ETFsሻ, 
iqS ,ln  is  the  log  of  proportional  quoted  spread,  iTimeiq DS ,,ln ×  is  the  interaction  term 
between the log of proportional quoted spread and the time dummy.   
The estimate of α  is  the proportional quoted spread due to order processing, and that of
α∆  measures  the  change  of  order  processing  component  after  the  introduction  of  ETFs.  
Let  the  notation  IR  be  the  relative  cost  share  of  information  component,  the  change  of 
information component after the introduction of ETFs is: 
αααα ∆−=−−∆+−=− )1())(1(,, BeforeIAfterI RR  .............................................................................. ሺ11ሻ 
Thus, I test the null hypothesis  that the estimate of  α∆  is significantly different from zero.  





























Again,  I  test  the  hypothesis  that  whether  the  proportion  of  adverse  selection  costs  that 
dealers charge from quoted spread is significantly different from zero.   
To  estimate  the  information  component  of  spread  in  the  combined  market 
ሺcombining index and ETF option markets for NASDAQ 100 index and Standard and Poor’s 
500  index,  respectivelyሻ,  the  spreads  are  weighted  by  trading  volume.    Before  the 
introduction  of  ETFs,  only  index  option  contracts  exist  and  the  spread  of  each  option 
contract is not weighted by the total average dollar volume.  After the introduction of ETF 
options,  the  average  proportional  effective  and  quoted  spreads,  and  revenue  from 
proportional  effective and quoted  spreads  for each option contract  ሺindex and ETFsሻ are 
weighed by their average dollar  trading volume to total average dollar  trading volume in 
the combined market. 











































titiiweight TumeTradingVolPTumeTradingVolPD  for  option 
contract  ሺboth  index and ETF optionsሻ after ETF options were  introduced.   N here  is  the 
total number of option contracts in the combined market. 
One might be interested to see whether index and ETF options are close substitutes 
after  the  ETF  options  were  introduced.    To  examine  this  issue,  I  employ  the  seemingly 
unrelated regression technique and test whether the order processing costs between these 
two  types  of  options  are  significantly  different.    More  specifically,  I  run  the  following 
seemingly  unrelated  regressions  and  test  whether  the  coefficient  of  order  processing 
component of spreads across equations is the same.   
indexiindexiqindexi SS ,,,11, lnln εαγ ++=
∧
 ....................................................................................................... ሺ15ሻ 
ETFiETFiqETFi SS ,,,22, lnln εαγ ++=
∧
 ........................................................................................................ ሺ16ሻ 
I  test  the  null  hypothesis  that  whether  the  difference  of  the  estimates,  1α  and  2α ,is 
significantly different from zero.   




indexiindexiqindexi SpreadEffectiveS ,,,33, ln)ln( εαγ ++=  ........................................................................ ሺ17ሻ 




])ln[(])ln[( ,,,55,, indexiqindexiindexiindexi SllarVolumeAvgDailyDoSllarVolumeAvgDailyDo ×+=×
∧ αγ ሺ19ሻ 
])ln[(])ln[( ,,,66,, ETFiqETFiETFiETFi SllarVolumeAvgDailyDoSllarVolumeAvgDailyDo ×+=×
∧ αγ  ሺ20ሻ 
0: 650 =−ααH  
])ln[(])ln[( ,,,77,, indexiqindexiindexiindexi SllarVolumeAvgDailyDopreadEffectiveSllarVolumeAvgDailyDo ×+=× αγ ሺ21ሻ 
])ln[(])ln[( ,,,88,, ETFiqETFiETFiETFi SllarVolumeAvgDailyDopreadEffectiveSllarVolumeAvgDailyDo ×+=× αγ  ሺ22ሻ 








options,  and  Standard  and  Poor’s  500  index  ሺSPXሻ  and  S &  P Depository  Receipts  ሺSPYሻ 
options for all‐year period.  The low and high for the mean of log proportional effective and 
quoted spreads  for NASDAQ 100  index ሺNDXሻ options are between 3.07 and 3.16.   These 
figures are equivalent  to 21.56% and 23.59% before  logarithm.    For Standard and Poor’s 
500  index ሺSPXሻ options,  the  low and high  for  the mean of  log proportional effective and 
quoted spreads are between 2.47 and 2.83. These numbers are equivalent to 11.81% and 
16.98%  before  logarithm.    For  NASDAQ  100  equity  ሺQQQሻ  options,  the  mean  of  log 


















ሻ   3.244 0.616 2.322 4.283 
LnሺEffective Spreadሻ   3.071 0.511 2.338 3.871 
LnሺSqሻ ሺQuoted Spreadሻ   3.161 0.755 1.921 4.353 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume* GS
∧
ሻ  6.416 0.975 4.778 7.966 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume*Effective 
Spreadሻ  6.243 0.869 4.759 7.626 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume*Sqሻ  6.333 0.819 4.951 7.675 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volumeሻ  7.777 1.066 5.818 9.324 
LnሺAvg. Daily Volumeሻ  5.478 0.875 3.956 6.850 
Moneyness ሺMedianሻ ሺ%ሻ  ‐4.405 4.868 ‐13.125 2.678 

















ሻ   2.787 0.582 1.892 3.802 
LnሺEffective Spreadሻ   2.624 0.619 1.736 3.697 
LnሺSqሻ ሺQuoted Spreadሻ   2.566 0.894 1.341 4.050 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume* GS
∧
ሻ  5.094 1.090 3.141 6.663 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume*Effective 
Spreadሻ  4.931 1.100 2.960 6.592 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume*Sqሻ  4.874 1.248 2.636 6.710 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volumeሻ  6.913 1.070 4.949 8.411 
LnሺAvg. Daily Volumeሻ  6.679 1.222 4.479 8.451 
Moneyness ሺMedianሻ ሺ%ሻ  ‐1.053 6.857 ‐12.193 10.282 

















ሻ  2.832 0.681 1.844 4.021 
LnሺEffective Spreadሻ  2.632 0.651 1.642 3.774 
LnሺSqሻ ሺQuoted Spreadሻ  2.469 1.004 0.861 4.098 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume* GS
∧
ሻ  7.169 1.144 5.073 8.795 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume*Effective 
Spreadሻ  6.968 1.071 5.003 8.479 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume*Sqሻ  6.805 1.160 4.650 8.455 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volumeሻ  8.941 1.346 6.349 10.736 
LnሺAvg. Daily Volumeሻ  6.510 1.171 4.333 8.169 
Moneyness ሺMedianሻ ሺ%ሻ  ‐2.269 5.499 ‐11.908 7.109 
















ሻ  2.765 0.610 1.792 3.903 
LnሺEffective Spreadሻ  2.569 0.645 1.602 3.705 
LnሺSqሻ ሺQuoted Spreadሻ  2.377 0.990 0.967 3.978 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume* GS
∧
ሻ  4.835 1.051 3.053 6.593 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume*Effective 
Spreadሻ  4.639 1.000 2.929 6.262 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume*Sqሻ  4.447 1.076 2.685 6.210 
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volumeሻ  6.675 1.133 4.599 8.373 
LnሺAvg. Daily Volumeሻ  6.014 1.085 4.252 7.756 
Moneyness ሺMedianሻ ሺ%ሻ  ‐0.838 4.361 ‐8.178 6.312 










∧ −= titiiG RDRDLnSLn is the modified spread measure of George et al ሺ1991ሻ, 

























−= ,  where  tiP ,  is  the  closing  price  of 












−= , where  tilastaskP ,,  is  the daily closing ask price, while 

















ሺon  a  per  share  basisሻ  for  NASDAQ  100  index  ሺNDXሻ  is  between  $6.24  and  $6.42.  
Equivalently,  it  is between $514.40 and $611.55 before  the  logarithm.   For Standard and 
Poor’s 500 index ሺSPXሻ options, the mean of  log average daily revenue from last effective 
spread and quoted spread ሺon a per share basisሻ is between $6.81 and $7.17.  These figures 
are  equivalent  to  $902.35  and  $1,298.55  before  the  logarithm.    For NASDAQ 100  equity 
options,  the  mean  of  log  average  daily  revenue  from  last  effective  spread  and  quoted 
spread  ሺon  a  per  share  basisሻ  is  between  $4.87  and  $5.09.    Equivalently,  it  is  between 
$130.84 and $163.04 before  the  logarithm.   The mean of  log average daily  revenue  from 
last effective spread and quoted spread ሺon a per share basisሻ for S & P Depository Receipts 
ሺSPYሻ  options  is  between  $4.45  and  $4.83.    These  are  equivalent  to  $85.37  and  $125.84 
before the logarithm.  The average daily revenue from last effective and quoted spread for 
ETF  options  is  less  than  these  for  index  options.    The  mean  of  log  dollar  volume  for 
NASDAQ 100 index ሺNDXሻ and Standard and Poor’s 500 index ሺSPXሻ options is also relative 
larger to their ETF counterparts.  This confirms that the earlier observation that options on 







similar  variability  over  the  sample  period.    The  log  revenue  from  effective  spread  and 
quoted  spread  for  NASDAQ  100  index  ሺNDXሻ  options  vary  somewhat  less  than  its 
counterpart, while  the  same  estimates  for  Standard  and  Poor’s  500  index  ሺSPXሻ  options 
vary slightly more than S & P Depository Receipts ሺSPYሻ options.   
George  et  al  ሺ1991ሻ  show  that  using  Roll  ሺ1984ሻ  measure  deletes  too  many 
observations, and cause bias of the estimates.  Although I do not report the table here, Roll 
ሺ1984ሻ  measure,  in  the  present  study,  generates  36.6%  to  39.6%  of  negative  effective 
spreads, while  the measure of George et al  ሺ1991ሻ produces  less  than 1.24% of negative 
spreads.  The percentage of the sample with negative spreads is similar to that of George et 
al ሺ1991ሻ.   
The  estimates  of  adverse  selection  component  of  log  quoted  spread  and  revenue 
from quoted spread are reported in Table 3.   The change of order processing component, 
α∆ ,  increases  significantly  for  near‐the‐money NASDAQ  100  index  ሺNDXሻ  and  Standard 
and  Poor’s  500  index  ሺSPXሻ  options  after  the  introduction  of  ETFs.    The  p‐values  are 
significant at 1% level except the Roll ሺ1984ሻ measure and log effective spread  ሺdefined in 
Equation  3ሻ  for  NASDAQ  100  index  ሺNDXሻ  options.    The  increase  in  order  processing 
component  reduces  adverse  selection  costs  that  dealers  charge  to  option  traders.    For 
NASDAQ 100 index ሺNDXሻ options, the magnitudes of information component of log quoted 
spread and revenue from quoted spread decrease 21%, between 25% and 30%, and 11% 









The  estimates  of  order  processing  component  for  NASDAQ  100  equity  ሺQQQQሻ 
options,  and  S  &  P  Depository  Receipts  ሺSPYሻ  options  are  also  significant  at  1%  level.  
Indirectly, the adverse selection component,  α−1 , of log quoted spread and revenue from 
quoted spread ranges from 33.2% to 55.7%, and 17.2% to 25.7% for NASDAQ 100 equity 
ሺQQQQሻ  options  using  Roll  ሺ1984ሻ  and  George  et  al  ሺ1991ሻ  measures.    Likewise,  the 
information components of  log quoted spread and revenue from quoted spread for S & P 
Depository Receipts ሺSPYሻ options are between 42% and 57.3%, and between 17.9% and 
24.3%  for  the  sample  with  Roll  ሺ1984ሻ  and  George  et  al  ሺ1991ሻ  measures.    The  larger 
proportions of log quoted spread and revenue from quoted spread due to adverse selection 
imply more information related trading in the ETF option markets.   
The  log  effective  spread  and  revenue  from  effective  spread  drop  substantially  for 
near‐the‐money  NASDAQ  100  index  ሺNDXሻ  and  Standard  and  Poor’s  500  index  ሺSPXሻ 
options after the introduction of ETFs.  All estimates are significant at 5% level except the 
sample of log effective spread using Roll ሺ1984ሻ measure.   
Combining  the  index  and  ETF  option  markets  for  each  index  ሺNASDAQ  100  and 
Standard & Poor’s 500ሻ,  I also  find significant  increase of order processing component of 
log  weighted  quoted  spread  and  revenue  from  weighted  quoted  spread.    Conversely, 
adverse  selection  components drop  significantly using either Roll  ሺ1984ሻ or George et  al 
ሺ1991ሻ  spread  measures.    The  magnitudes  of  information  component  of  log  weighted
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   γ   γ∆   α α∆ Pሺγ ሻ ሺ γ∆ ሻ Pሺα ሻ  Pሺ α∆ ሻ Adj R‐Sq.
Lnሺ
∧
S ሻ         
Roll  2.539  ‐0.436  0.360 ‐0.016 0.000 0.244 0.006  0.906  0.139
George et al  2.471  ‐0.859  0.292 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.005  0.326
          
LnሺEff. Spሻ         
Roll  1.539  ‐0.367  0.607 ‐0.017 0.000 0.034 0.000  0.784  0.681
George et al  1.728  ‐0.576  0.523 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.137  0.688




S ሻ         
Roll  2.323  ‐2.718  0.751 0.296 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.012  0.486
George et al  2.121  ‐2.035  0.736 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.588
          
LnሺAvg. 
Daily$Vol* 
Eff. Spሻ         
Roll  1.180  ‐1.400  0.886 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.063  0.761








Roll  1.708 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.224 
George et al  1.650 0.443 0.000 0.000 0.463 
     
LnሺEff. Spሻ    
Roll  0.985 0.640 0.000 0.000 0.825 





Roll  1.193 0.764 0.000 0.000 0.584 
George et al  1.472 0.743 0.000 0.000 0.724 
     
LnሺAvg. Daily $Vol*Eff. Spሻ    
Roll  0.861 0.831 0.000 0.000 0.886 







   γ   γ∆   α α∆ Pሺγ ሻ Pሺ γ∆ ሻ Pሺα ሻ  Pሺ α∆ ሻ  Adj R‐sq.
Lnሺ
∧
S ሻ          
Roll  1.961  ‐0.365  0.393 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.012  0.298
George et al  1.966  ‐0.559  0.385 0.144 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.455
           
LnሺEff. Spሻ          
Roll  1.457  ‐0.482  0.518 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.749
George et al  1.507  ‐0.533  0.496 0.122 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.727




S ሻ          
Roll  1.357  ‐1.110  0.878 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.012  0.574
George et al  2.227  ‐1.059  0.749 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.633
           
LnሺAvg. Daily 
$Vol*Eff. Spሻ          
Roll  1.655  ‐1.004  0.799 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.764









Roll  1.617 0.444 0.000 0.000 0.341 
George et al  1.746 0.429 0.000 0.000 0.484 
     
LnሺEff. Spሻ    
Roll  1.189 0.583 0.000 0.000 0.805 





Roll  1.217 0.791 0.000 0.000 0.520 
George et al  1.470 0.757 0.000 0.000 0.599 
     
LnሺAvg. Daily $Volume*Eff. Spሻ    
Roll  1.034 0.811 0.000 0.000 0.771 

















S ሻ,  Lnሺ preadEffectiveS ሻ,  LnሺAvg.  Daily  $Vol*
∧
S ሻ,  LnሺAvg.  Daily  $Vol* preadEffectiveS ሻ  are 
the dependent variables for the following regressions.   
iiTimeiqiqiTimei DSSDS εααγγ +×∆++∆+=
∧
,,,, lnlnln     and 
iiTimeiqiqiTimei DSSDpreadEffectiveS εααγγ +×∆++∆+= ,,,, lnln)ln(      are  for  NASDAQ  100 
ሺNDXሻ and Standard and Poor’s 500 Index ሺSPXሻ Options.   
iiqi SS εαγ ++=
∧
,lnln     and 




















































































quoted  spread  decrease  between  24%  and  50%,  and  36.2%  to  52.4%  for  NASDAQ  100 
index and Standard and Poor’s 500 index combined markets, respectively.  These estimates 
are  all  significant  at  1%  level.    The  total  numbers  of  option  contracts  for  the  combined 
NASDAQ 100 index and equity options are 1609 and 2511 using Roll ሺ1984ሻ measure and 
George et al ሺ1991ሻ measure, respectively.  For the combined Standard & Porr’s 500 index 









Exchange  ሺCBOEሻ  and  International  Securities  Exchange  ሺISEሻ,  and  Standard  and  Poor’s 
500 index ሺSPXሻ options are traded exclusively on CBOE only.  Although the sample in this 
study is limited to options traded on CBOE, 90% of the trading volume goes through CBOE.  
Thus,  the  sample  used  in  this  paper  is  representative  of  the  options  trading  in  the  U.S.  
Exclusive  licensing  right  that  indices developers grant  to  certain option exchanges might 
explain  index  option  markets  are  subject  to  less  competition.    Dealers  raise  order 
processing proportion of log quoted spread to compensate the loss of dollar trading volume 
to  ETF  option  markets.    Informed  traders  in  index  options  market  are  deterred  by  the 
higher  order  processing  costs,  and  switch  to  ETF  options market.    In  addition,  ETFs  are 
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traded  continuously.    Informed  traders probably  trade more of ETF options,  especially  if 
information is short‐lived.   
Table  4  reports  the  results  of  testing  the  difference  of  order  processing  costs 
between  index  and  ETF  options  after  ETFs  are  introduced.    Table  4  Panel  A  shows  the 






processing  components  of  log  quoted  spreads  are  50.2%  and  33.4%,  respectively.    The 
order  processing  components  using  the  other  log  effective  spread  measure  ሺdefined  in 
equation  3ሻ  are  58.7%  and  49.8%  for  NASDAQ  100  index  ሺNDXሻ  and  Equity  ሺQQQQሻ 
options, respectively.   The log revenue from effective spreads using the method of George 
et  al  ሺ1991ሻ  ሺdefined  in  equation 5ሻ  accounts  for  98.6% and 67.3% of  log  revenue  from 
quoted  spreads  for  NASDAQ  100  index  ሺNDXሻ  and  Equity  ሺQQQQሻ  options,  respectively.  
The order processing component using the log revenue from effective spreads ሺdefined in 
equation  6ሻ  accounts  for  98.6%  and  67.3%  of  log  revenue  from  quoted  spreads  for 
NASDAQ 100 index ሺNDXሻ and Equity ሺQQQQሻ options, respectively.   
The  p‐value  for  each Wald  statistic  for  testing  the  difference  of  order  processing 









 Ticker   Dependent Variable  γ Pሺγ ሻ α Pሺα ሻ  Obs
NDX  Lnሺ
∧
S ሻ  ‐0.681 0.000 0.502 0.000  755
QQQQ  Lnሺ
∧
S ሻ  ‐1.030 0.000 0.334 0.000  755




S ሻ  0.168 0.000  755
        
      γ Pሺγ ሻ α Pሺα ሻ  Obs
NDX  LnሺEff. Spሻ  ‐0.748 0.000 0.587 0.000  757
QQQQ  LnሺEff. Spሻ  ‐0.899 0.000 0.498 0.000  757
      α∆ Pሺ α∆ ሻ 
NDX & 
QQQQ  LnሺEff. Spሻ  0.089 0.000  757
        
      γ Pሺγ ሻ α Pሺα ሻ  Obs
NDX  LnሺAvg. Day $Vol*
∧
S ሻ 0.087 0.645 0.986 0.000  755
QQQQ  LnሺAvg. Day $Vol*
∧
S ሻ 1.974 0.000 0.673 0.000  755




S ሻ 0.312 0.000  755
        
      γ Pሺγ ሻ α Pሺα ሻ  Obs
NDX 
LnሺAvg. Day 
$Volume*Eff. Spሻ  ‐0.053 0.678 0.979 0.000  757
QQQQ 
LnሺAvg. Day 
$Volume*Eff. Spሻ  1.265 0.000 0.773 0.000  757












Ticker   Dependent Variable   γ Pሺγ ሻ α Pሺα ሻ  Obs
SPX  Lnሺ
∧
S ሻ  ‐0.802 0.000 0.479 0.000  835
SPY  Lnሺ
∧
S ሻ  ‐0.885 0.000 0.429 0.000  835
      α∆ Pሺ α∆ ሻ 
SPX & SPY  Lnሺ
∧
S ሻ  0.050 0.029  835
        
      γ Pሺγ ሻ α Pሺα ሻ  Obs
SPX  LnሺEff. Spሻ  ‐0.818 0.000 0.570 0.000  835
SPY  LnሺEff. Spሻ  ‐0.744 0.000 0.580 0.000  835
      α∆ Pሺ α∆ ሻ 
SPX & SPY  LnሺEff. Spሻ  ‐0.010 0.482  835
        
      γ Pሺγ ሻ α Pሺα ሻ  Obs
SPX  LnሺAvg. Day $Vol*
∧
S ሻ  0.990 0.000 0.873 0.000  835
SPY  LnሺAvg. Day $Vol*
∧
S ሻ  1.470 0.000 0.757 0.000  835
      α∆ Pሺ α∆ ሻ 
SPX & SPY  LnሺAvg. Day $Vol*
∧
S ሻ  0.116 0.000  835
        
      γ Pሺγ ሻ α Pሺα ሻ  Obs
SPX 
LnሺAvg. Day $Vol* 
Eff. Spሻ  0.627 0.000 0.900 0.000  835
SPY 
LnሺAvg. Day $Vol* 
Eff. Spሻ  0.988 0.000 0.821 0.000  835
      α∆ Pሺ α∆ ሻ 
SPX & SPY 
LnሺAvg. Day $Vol* 









 Ticker   Dep. Var.  γ   Pሺγ ሻ α Pሺα ሻ ߚ Pሺߚሻ  Obs
NDX  Lnሺ
∧
S ሻ  ‐.637  .000 .501 .000 .002  .604  755
QQQQ  Lnሺ
∧
S ሻ  ‐1.187 .000 .334 .000 ‐.008  .025  755




S ሻ     0.167 0.000   755
          
      γ   Pሺγ ሻ α Pሺα ሻ ߚ Pሺߚሻ  Obs
NDX  LnሺEff. Spሻ  ‐.565  .000 .582 .000 .010  .000  757
QQQQ  LnሺEff. Spሻ  ‐1.121 .000 .499 .000 ‐.012  .000  757
         α∆ Pሺ α∆ ሻ  
NDX & 
QQQQ  LnሺEff. Spሻ     .083 .000   757
          










S ሻ  1.607 .000 .663 .000 ‐.022  .000  755






S ሻ     0.325 .000   755
          








Spሻ  .909  .000 .764 .000 ‐.021  .000  757















 Ticker   Dep. Var.  γ   Pሺγ ሻ α Pሺα ሻ ߚ Pሺߚሻ  Obs
SPX  Lnሺ
∧
S ሻ  ‐.816  .000 .478 .000 .001  .963  835
SPY  Lnሺ
∧
S ሻ  ‐1.339 .000 .343 .000 .061  .003  835
         α∆ Pሺ α∆ ሻ  
SPX & SPY  Lnሺ
∧
S ሻ     .135 0.000   835
          
      γ   Pሺγ ሻ α Pሺα ሻ ߚ Pሺߚሻ  Obs
SPX  LnሺEff. Spሻ  ‐.895  .000 .564 .000 .011  .415  835
SPY  LnሺEff. Spሻ  ‐1.173 .000 .525 .000 .068  .000  835
         α∆ Pሺ α∆ ሻ  
SPX & SPY  LnሺEff. Spሻ     .039 .031   835
          










S ሻ  1.355 .000 .726 .000 .052  .139  835





S ሻ     .111 .007   835
          








Spሻ  .813  .000 .792 .000 .063  .007  835
























indexiindexiqindexi SS ,,,11, lnln εαγ ++=
∧
 
ETFiETFiqETFi SS ,,,22, lnln εαγ ++=
∧
 
0: 210 =−ααH  
indexiindexiqindexi SpreadEffectiveS ,,,33, ln)ln( εαγ ++=  
ETFiETFiqETFi SpreadEffectiveS ,,,44, ln)ln( εαγ ++=  
0: 430 =−ααH  
indexiindexiqindexiindexiindexi SVolAvgDaySVolAvgDay ,,,,55,, ])$ln[(])$ln[( εαγ +×+=×
∧
 
ETFiETFiqETFiETFiETFi SVolAvgDaySVolAvgDay ,,,,66,, ])$ln[(])$ln[( εαγ +×+=×
∧
 
0: 650 =−ααH  
indexiindexiqindexiindexiindexi SVolAvgDaypreadEffectiveSVolAvgDay ,,,,77,, ])$ln[(])$ln[( εαγ +×+=×  
ETFiETFiqETFiETFiETFi SVolAvgDaypreadEffectiveSVolAvgDay ,,,,88,, ])$ln[(])$ln[( εαγ +×+=×  
0: 870 =−ααH  











indexiiindexiqindexi prcdSS ,1,,11, lnln εβαγ +++=
∧
 
ETFiiETFiqETFi prcdSS ,2,,22, lnln εβαγ +++=
∧
 
0: 210 =−ααH  
indexiiindexiqindexi prcdSpreadEffectiveS ,3,,33, ln)ln( εβαγ +++=  
ETFiiETFiqETFi prcdSpreadEffectiveS ,4,,44, ln)ln( εβαγ +++=  
0: 430 =−ααH  
indexiiindexiqindexiindexiindexi prcdSVolAvgDaySVolAvgDay ,5,,,55,, ])$ln[(])$ln[( εβαγ ++×+=×
∧
 
ETFiiETFiqETFiETFiETFi prcdSVolAvgDaySVolAvgDay ,6,,,66,, ])$ln[(])$ln[( εβαγ ++×+=×
∧
 
0: 650 =−ααH  
indexiiindexiqindexiindexiindexi prcdSVolAvgDaypreadEffectiveSVolAvgDay ,7,,,77,, ])$ln[(])$ln[( εβαγ ++×+=×  
ETFiiETFiqETFiETFiETFi prcdSVolAvgDaypreadEffectiveSVolAvgDay ,7,,,88,, ])$ln[(])$ln[( εβαγ ++×+=×  
0: 870 =−ααH  
iprcd  denotes the absolute value of the price difference between the underlying index and ETF.   






for  these  two  types  of  options  are  different,  and  also  their  corresponding  information 




except  for  the case using  log effective spread ሺdefined in equation 3ሻ.   For the case using 
the  log  effective  spread  by George  et  al  ሺ1991ሻ,  the  order  processing  components  of  log 
quoted spreads are 47.9% and 42.9% for Standard and Poor’s 500  index ሺSPXሻ and S & P 
Depository  Receipts  ሺSPYሻ  options,  respectively.    The  log  effective  spread  ሺdefined  in 
equation 3ሻ weighs 57% and 58% of log quoted spread for Standard and Poor’s 500 index 
ሺSPXሻ  and  S &  P Depository Receipts  ሺSPYሻ  options,  respectively.    The  log  revenue  from 
effective spreads using the method of George et al ሺ1991ሻ ሺdefined in equation 5ሻ accounts 
for  87.3%  and  75.7%  of  log  revenue  from  quoted  spreads  for  Standard  and  Poor’s  500 





testing  the difference of order  processing  components between Standard and Poor’s 500 






Equity  ሺQQQQሻ options,  and  Standard  and Poor’s  500  index  ሺSPXሻ  and  S & P Depository 










One might  question why  investors  are willing  to  pay  the  premium  to  trade  index 
options.    It  is  probably  the  price  investors  pay  in  order  to  trade  in  a market where  less 
informed  trading  occurs.    Even  though  an  exchange  trade  fund  mimics  its  index 
counterpart, its portfolio holdings are narrower than those in an index.  Thus, it is easy for 
an  investor  to  follow  the underlying ETF and  to predict  the price  change.   Consequently, 
more investors trade more of ETFs and options on ETF.  The variation of returns on an ETF 
should  be  higher  than  that  on  an  index.    Appendix  C  shows  the  summary  statistics  of 
returns  on  NASDAQ  100  index,  S  &  P  100  index,  and  their  ETF  counterparts  after  ETF 
options are introduced.  The standard deviations of returns on NASDAQ 100 index and ETF 
are 2.5225% and 2.4733%, respectively.  However, the other pair, S & P 500 index and ETF, 























costs  for  index  options  have  declined  significantly  for  near‐the‐money  index  options 
subsequent to the introduction of ETF options.  This finding supports the implication of the 
Chowdhry  and  Nanda  ሺ1991ሻ  model.    On  the  other  hand,  order  processing  costs  have 
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increased during the same period  for  index options.    I offer  the  following explanation  for 
the  increased  order  processing  costs.    Dealers  trading  NASDAQ  100  index  ሺNDXሻ  and 
Standard and Poor’s 500 index ሺSPXሻ options on CBOE possess monopolistic power, due to 
the  exclusive  licensing  right  that  index  developers  grant  to  option  exchanges.    Informed 
traders  in  index  options market  are  deterred  by  the  higher  order  processing  costs,  and 
switch to ETF options market.   
The results from testing the difference of order processing costs between these two 
types  of  options  indicate  that  the  index  and  ETF  options  are  not  close  substitutes.  
Dealers/specialists in each type of options markets have their clienteles after ETF options 
are introduced.  Not all index option traders will switch to ETF options markets.  This also 
explains  that dealers/specialists  in  index options markets  can  raise  the order processing 
costs to deterred information related trading.   
For  future  research,  I will  extend  to  trade  and quote data,  estimating  the  adverse 
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I  assume  that  transaction  costs  ሺeffective  spreadsሻ  possess  the  Cobb‐Douglas 
production functional form. 
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Ticker   Name  Mean Std Dev Corr  Obs





Traded Fund  ‐0.0037 2.4733 757
SPX  S&P 500 Index  0.0362 0.6469
0.9726 
835
SPY  S&P Depository Receipts 0.0433 0.6472 835
 
Notes:   
Appendix C  reports descriptive  statistics  for  returns on NASDAQ 100  Index,  PowerShare 
Exchange Trade Fund, S&P 500 Index, and S&P Depository Receipts.  PowerShare Exchange 
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This research investigates whether the liquidity premium associated with holding equities 
has declined with the declining transactions costs of trading securities.  The existence of an 
equity market liquidity premium is well documented in US markets.1  Also, Jones (2002) 
and Hasbrouck (2005) document that the transactions cost of trading in U.S. equity 
markets has dramatically declined over the past several decades.  While market liquidity 
has undoubtly improved over time as transactions cost declines, a historic liquidity 
premium may not be important in current securities pricing.   
The standard CAPM does not consider liquidity effects as in its zero transaction cost 
world there is no liquidity premium as trade is frictionless in a perfectly competitive 
market.  More recent liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing models (L-CAPM) proposed by 
Jacoby, Fowler and Gottesman (2000), and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) take into account 
the effects on asset prices in a non-zero transactions cost asset market.  Liquidity premia 
arise as compensation to investors for systematic differences in security trading cost and 
the uncertainties of future trading costs.  Required rates of return are determined by 
sensitivities to the liquidly premia in addition to the conventional CAPM market premium.  
                                                          
1 See Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Chan and Faff 
(2005), and Acharya and Pedersen (2005). 
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The L-CAPM predicts that the liquidity premium for holding securities should decrease as 
the costs of transactions decline.  
There are very few empirical investigations into the time variation of liquidity 
premia and none that research the connection between time-varying liquidity premia and 
declines in transactions costs.  While all other studies investigate the liquidity premia in the 
cross section of securities, Gibson and Mougeot (2004) examine time-variation in market 
liquidity premium using the Standard and Poor’s 500 index and its share turnover. 
However, their bivariate GARCH-in-mean model is not robust to different liquidity 
measures because the multi-collinearity problem induced in the model.   
This research takes the portfolio approach to investigate whether the liquidity 
premium still exists as the transactions cost declines over time.  Because liquidity exists in 
different dimensions, using various liquidity measures produces reliable and robust 
results.  In this study, I use nine liquidity measures, defined in Section 3, to form deciles 
liquidity portfolios.  Several benchmark asset pricing models are employed to estimate 
liquidity premia in nine different periods (defined in Section 3).  This study also attempts 
to find whether adding a liquidity factor to the Fama-French 3-Factor model improves 
predicting performance.  Thus, this research contributes to the current literature in two 
folds. First, it investigates whether the liquidity premium decreases in the time-varying 
framework as costs of trading equity decrease.  Second, it examines the validity of the 
implications from liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing models, and provides new insight 
into whether liquidly risk is important to current asset prices.   
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The sample used in this research covers the non-financial firms (share codes: 10 
and 11) from NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ compiled by Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) from 1926 to 2006.  Results show that the liquidity premium exists and increases in 
the period from 2001 to 2006, which contradicts to the implication of the liquidity-adjusted 
CAPM.  One possible explanation is that the liquidity premium is more related to size and 
book-to-market factors, rather than the liquidity factor.  This is left for future research.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 discusses data and methodologies, Section 4 discusses results, and Section 5 
concludes.   
 
 
2. Literature review 
Prior literature investigating the effect of liquidity on equity expected returns starts 
from Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) seminal paper.  Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
develop a theoretical model and test the implication that the expected return is increasing 
and concave in the relative spread (defined as the dollar spread divided by the average of 
the bid and ask prices at year end).  The empirical results from the pooled cross-sectional 
regression support their theory.   
Other theoretical papers, however, have mixed predictions about the impact of 
transaction cost on expected equity returns.  Constantinides (1986) and Vayanos (1998) 
predict that transaction costs have only a second-order effect on equilibrium asset returns.  
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Because investors are able to accommodate liquidity shocks by reducing the frequency or 
volume of trade, a small liquidity premium is sufficient to compensate investors for 
deviating from target portfolio proportions.  Recent theoretical papers by Huang (2003), 
modeling an economy with liquidity shocks and the borrowing constraints, Lo, Mamaysky, 
and Wang (2004), investigating the effect of fixed transaction costs on asset prices, and 
Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2005), considering the stochastic investment opportunity 
set in a regime-switching model, predict that transaction costs have a greater impact on 
asset returns.  The theoretical prediction by Constantinides (1986) and Vayanos (1998) 
contrasts to the findings in empirical studies, while the one by Huang (2003), Mamaysky, 
and Wang (2004), and Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2005) supports the empirical 
evidence.   
Following Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) seminal paper, numerous studies 
empirically investigate the cross-sectional relationship between liquidity and expected 
equity returns.  Except Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) and Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996), other studies such as Amihud and Mendelson (1989), Eleswarapu 
(1997), Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998), 
Amihud (2002), Spiegel and Wang (2005), and Hasbrouck (2005) all support Amihud and 
Mendelsen’s prediction that average equity returns are positively (negatively) related to 
the illiquidity (liquidity) in the U.S. equity markets.  Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) 
question whether Amihud and Mendelsen’s empirical evidence is due to seasonal behavior 
(the January effect) and restrictive portfolio selection criteria.  Using a different portfolio 
formation criterion and the Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression method, 
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Eleswarapu and Reinganum find that the liquidity premium exists only in the months of 
January for the NYSE securities in the period from 1961 to1990.   
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) examine whether illiquidity is caused by 
information asymmetry and estimate it from intraday data.  They decompose trading cost 
into fixed and variable components, and investigate the relation between Fama-French risk  
adjusted returns and transaction costs.  They find a concave relation between a return 
premium and the variable cost, while a convex relation between the premium and the fixed 
cost, which is inconsistent with Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) prediction.   
Amihud and Mendelson (1989) jointly test the cross-sectional relation among 
expected returns, systematic risk, residual risk, firm size, and bid-ask spreads because 
these variables are interrelated and predicted by Merton (1987) and Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986).  Their results support that the expected return is increasing in betas 
and bid-ask spreads, but do not support the hypothesis that the expected return is an 
increasing function of residual risk and firm size.   
Examining the relationship between the expected returns and the relative spread 
for the NASDAQ securities, Eleswarapu (1997) finds that the positive and significant 
liquidity premium exists both in January and non-January months, and his findings support 
Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) model.  Eleswarapu conjectures that the different results 
between the NASDAQ and NYSE securities are due to the large variation of spreads of the 
NASDAQ securities and dealer’s inside spreads being a better proxy for the actual 
transaction cost.   
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Empiricists use different measures to proxy for liquidity and test Amihud and 
Mendelson’s model implication.  For example, Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) employ dollar trading volume, Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998) use turnover rate 
(the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding in that equity), 
and Amihud (2002) constructs an illiquidity measure, defined as the average ratio of the 
daily absolute return to nonzero trading volume over some period, to proxy for liquidity.  
These studies all document that the cross-sectional equity liquidity premium is priced.   
Hasbrouck (2005) estimates various liquidity measures [Amivest liquidity ratio 
(Cooper, Groth, and Avera(1985)), the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, the Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) reversal coefficient, and the Gibbs estimate of the effective cost] from 
daily data and analyze the cross-sectional relationship between risk-adjusted returns and 
liquidity.  In general, the risk-adjusted returns are positively related to these liquidity 
measures.  However, the result is not robust to different correlation measures, and exhibits 
strong seasonal behavior in January.   
Spiegel and Wang (2005) examine the impact of idiosyncratic risk and liquidity on 
expected returns using the four liquidity measures described in Hasbrouck (2005).  
Overall, they find that equity returns are decreasing in liquidity and increasing in the 
idiosyncratic risk in the cross-sectional regression.  When both the liquidity measures and 
idiosyncratic risk are used to explain returns, liquidity seems to lose its role and the 
idiosyncratic risk has greater impact on cross-sectional expected returns.   
Empirical research also investigates the cross-sectional relationship between 
expected equity returns and volatility of liquidity.  Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman 
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(2001) test the hypothesis that risk-averse investors command higher expected returns 
when facing higher variability of liquidity.  Chordia et al use the second moment of dollar 
trading volume and share turnover as proxies for volatility of liquidity and find the 
surprising negative relationship between average equity returns and volatility of liquidity.  
Chollete (2004) also finds the negative volatility liquidity premium using Pastor and 
Stambaugh’s (2003) reversal coefficient as the liquidity measure.   
Pereira and Zhang (2004) create a liquidity premium model to explain the puzzling 
negative volatility liquidity premium.  Their model shows that the investor has the timing 
option to trade shares in high and low liquidity periods, so the liquidity premium decreases 
in the volatility of liquidity.  Pereira and Zhang’s (2004) model seems to explain the 
puzzling negative relation; nonetheless, their model is limited to numerical solutions.   
Recent empirical research has turned to examine the relationship between expected 
market returns and aggregate liquidity over time.  Amihud (2002) tests the hypotheses 
that over time the ex ante equity excess return is an increasing function of expected market 
illiquidity and unexpected illiquidity has a negative effect on contemporaneous equity 
returns.  The empirical results from NYSE securities in the period from 1963 to 1997 
support his hypotheses, and the market liquidity premium is priced over time.   
Nonetheless, Jun, Marathe, and Shawky (2003) show different results from the 
emerging markets.  Jun, Marathe, and Shawky (2003) regress equity market returns on 
turnover ratio, trading value, and turnover-volatility ratio within each emerging country 
(27 emerging markets in their study) from 1992 to 1999, and find that equity market 
returns are positively correlated with market liquidity.  Jun, Marathe, and Shawky (2003) 
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conclude that positive relationship between average equity returns and market liquidity 
over time is consistent with Ying (1966) and Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin’s (2001) high  
liquidity return premium hypothesis.  But this explanation contradicts to the argument of 
Ying (1966) and Gervais et al (2001) that the high liquidity return premium is a short-term 
phenomenon, not lasting for a longer period.   
Jones (2002) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003) show that aggregate 
liquidity exhibits some predicting power for future equity returns using vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models.  Jones (2002) assembles bid-ask spreads for Dow Jones 
securities for a century from 1900 to 2000, and shows that bid-ask spreads and turnover 
predict equity market returns one to three years ahead.  Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 
(2003) construct two liquidity measures, turnover and proportion of zero daily returns 
(Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999), and Lesmond (2002)), in their study of 19 
emerging equity markets.  In their quadravariate VAR analysis, they show that equity 
market liquidity predicts future equity returns, and the zero return measure has greater 
impact on expected returns than turnover.   
In the other stream of research, academicians investigate liquidity as a risk factor.  
On the theoretical side, Jacoby, Fowler and Gottesman (2000), and Acharya and Pedersen 
(2005) model the liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing models incorporating the impact 
of transaction costs on asset returns.  Jacoby, Fowler and Gottesman (2000) examine the 
relationship between the expected return and future spread costs, and their model  
predicts a convex relationship between the expected gross return and the future spread, 
which supports Brennan and Subrahmanyam’s (1996) empirical results.   
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Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM predicts that the expected 
return of a security is increasing in its expected illiquidity and its net beta (the covariance 
of its net return with the market portfolio’s net return.  Net return is defined as the return 
netting of the illiquidity cost).  They empirically test their unconditional model using 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure.  The results from testing the alpha being zero and the 
joint test of the intercept being zero and liquidity risk premium being equal support their 
liquidity-adjusted CAPM.   
On the empirical side, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Sadka (2004), Chan and Faff 
(2005), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003) document evidence that liquidity factor 
is priced both in the U.S. and other foreign equity markets.  Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) 
construct a sign-volume related liquidity measure which originates from order flows and 
future returns will reverse if a security is not perfectly liquid.  After sorting portfolios by 
the predicted liquidity betas, Pastor and Stambaugh examine whether the post-ranking 
alphas in different model specifications are significant different from zero.  They find that 
the post-ranking alphas between the highest and lowest liquidity portfolios are 
significantly different, indicating that the liquidity risk of these portfolios is different.   
Sadka (2004) introduces a liquidity measure from the variable component of a price 
impact model, and tests whether the non-traded liquidity factor is priced using the intraday 
data.  The augmented Fama-French three-factors with the market wide liquidity best 
explains the returns of the portfolios sorted by momentum and liquidity. The evidence 
documents that the liquidity risk is priced.   
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Using the Australian data, Chan and Faff (2005) investigate whether the liquidity 
factor explains the cross-sectional variation of equity returns.  Share turnover is used as a 
proxy for liquidity in their study, and the Fama-French three-factor is augmented with the 
liquidity factor (IMV, defined as the return on “illiquid minus very liquid” mimicking 
portfolio).  Chan and Faff test the alphas in the model using GMM approach, and the results 
show that over-identify restrictions imposed by this liquidity augmented Fama-French 
model cannot be rejected.  Furthermore, the turnover premium is significant and positive 
in their study.   
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003) develop a simple two-factor asset pricing 
model from bivariate VAR and allow for local or world market risk and local or global 
liquidity risk under the case that a country is integrated or segmented.  The evidence from 
19 emerging markets shows that local market liquidity is a priced risk factor and it is an 
important determinant of expected equity returns.   
In summary, different liquidity measures are aggregated and used in the empirical 
studies, and the evidence lends support that the liquidity factor and the market liquidity 




3. Data and Methodologies 
3.1 Data 
The sample used in this study includes all common equities (share codes=10 and 
11) from non-financial firms listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX), and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
System (NASDAQ) compiled by Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) from 1926 
to 2006.  All dividend distributions in a month are included to compute monthly returns 
(𝑟𝑒𝑡).   
 
3.2 Methodologies 
3.2.1 Construct Liquidity Measures and Data Analysis 
The daily total return (𝑟𝑑), closing price (𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑑), end of month shares outstanding 
(𝑠𝑕𝑜) (in 1,000s), volume (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑), dollar volume ($𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑), end of month market value of 
equity (𝑚𝑣𝑒) (in 1,000s), asking price (𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑑), and bid price (𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑) are used to construct 
monthly liquidity measures.  The subscript 𝑑 denotes for the daily frequency.  Sums and 
averages are over the trading days in each month.  Eleven liquidity measures are 
computed and nine of them are used to formed liquidity deciles portfolios.   
These eleven liquidity measures (in monthly frequency) are grouped into four 
categories: price impact measures, trading frequency measures, stale price measures, and 




 Price impact measures: 
1. The Amivest liquidity ratio: 𝑎𝑣𝑡 =  $𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑   𝑟𝑑   ∗ .000001,   (1) 
where $𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑= 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑑)(𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑).  It measures the scaled dollar volume changes per 
1% price change.  This version is used by Dubofsky & Groth (1984); Cooper, Groth, 
& Avera (1985); Khan & Baker (1993). 
2. The Amivest liquidity time-series ratio: 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 =  $𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑   𝑟𝑑  ∗ (1 𝑚𝑣𝑒 ). (2) 
It removes the trending problem by scaling the Amivest liquidity ratio by the 
inverse of market value of equity (1 𝑚𝑣𝑒 ), instead of .000001.   
3. The Amivest liquidity (variant) ratio: 𝑎𝑚𝑣 =  𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑   𝑟𝑑   ∗ .000001.  (3) 
It is a variant of Amivest liquidity ratio, using volume (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑), rather than dollar 
volume ($𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑).  This version is used by Amihud (1997); Berkman & Eleswarapu 
(1998).   
4. The Amivest liquidity (variant) time-series ratio: 
𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 =  𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑   𝑟𝑑   ∗ (1 𝑠𝑕𝑜 ).        (4) 
For time series comparisons, I scale the Amivest liquidity (variant) by the inverse of 
end of month share outstanding (1 𝑠𝑕𝑜 ).   
5. The Amihud illiquidity ratio: 𝑖𝑙𝑞 =  𝑟𝑑  $𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑               ∗ 10
6     (5) 
Amihud (2002) Illiquidity measures “the absolute (percentage) price change per 
dollar of daily trading volume, or the daily price impact of the order flow.” 
6. The Amihud illiquidity time-series ratio: 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 =  𝑟𝑑  $𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑               ∗ 𝑚𝑣𝑒  (6) 
For time series comparisons I scale the measure by 𝑚𝑣𝑒 instead of 1𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛. 
 Trading frequency measures: 
7. Share turnover: 𝑠𝑕𝑛 =  𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑕𝑜        (7) 
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Share turnover measures the number times shares outstanding are exchanged in a 
month.   
8. Market value turnover: 𝑚𝑣𝑛 =  $𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑚𝑣𝑒      (8) 
Market value turnover measures the number times the market value of equity is 
traded over a month.   
 Stale price measures: 
9. Proportion of zero return days: 𝑝𝑧𝑟 =  𝑧𝑟𝑑  𝑑𝑦𝑚     (9) 
where 𝑧𝑟𝑑  is the dummy for zero-return day (i.e. 𝑧𝑟𝑑 = 1 if 𝑟𝑑 = 0 on day 𝑑 and zero 
otherwise), and  𝑑𝑦𝑚 = number of trading days in month.  This ratio is used by 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2003).   
 Transaction cost measures: 
10. Spread measure: 𝑠𝑝 = (𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑑 − 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑)                        (10) 
Daily bid-ask spread is averaged over a month.   
11. Relative spread measure: 𝑟𝑠𝑝 = (𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑑 − 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑) 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑑)                                     (11) 
Daily relative bid-ask spread is average over a month.   
I compute these liquidity measures based on daily data, and then check the 
correlations among these measures and with other important variables: Momentum 
(𝑚𝑜𝑚), book-to-market (𝑏𝑚𝑒), market value of equity (𝑚𝑣𝑒), and lead returns (𝑟𝑒𝑡).  
Momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚) is defined as the average prior 2 to 12 months non-missing returns.  I 
use the Spearman rank correlations to check their correlations because liquidity portfolios, 
either in quintiles or deciles, are formed based on the rankings.   
Constant correlations may not correctly measure the relationship between these 
variables.  Thus, I compute rolling 60-month rank correlations at each month from 
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November 1930 to December 2006.  I compute the descriptive statistics (mean, minimum, 
and maximum) for the 914 rolling 60-month correlations.   
To see whether the market becomes more liquid over the years, I compute the 
percentage of firms in the most and least liquid quartile based on these 6 liquidity 
measures: Amivest liquidity ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡), Amihud illiquidity ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞), share turnover 
(𝑠𝑕𝑛), spread (𝑠𝑝), relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝), and proportion of zero return days (𝑝𝑧𝑟). The 
size breakpoints are the quartiles of market value equity of NYSE firms.  The medians of 
liquidity measures [Amivest liquidity time-series ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡), Amihud illiquidity time-
series ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡), share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛), spread (𝑠𝑝), relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝), and proportion 
of zero return days (𝑝𝑧𝑟)] are compared over years.  I graph the percentage of firms in 
most liquid quartile and transaction costs [ spread (𝑠𝑝), relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝)] over years.   
 
3.2.2 Portfolio Formations and Empirical Testing 
Securities are sorted based on the rankings of size (𝑚𝑣𝑒), book-to-market (𝑏𝑚𝑒) 
momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚) and nine liquidity measures: the Amivest liquidity ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡), the 
Amivest liquidity time-series ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡), the Amivest liquidity variant (𝑎𝑚𝑣), the Amihud 
illiquidity ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞), the Amihud illiquidity time-series ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡), share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛), 
spread (𝑠𝑝), relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝), and proportion of zero return days (𝑝𝑧𝑟), to form 
quintiles and deciles portfolios.  Portfolios sorted by the ranking of proportion of zero 
return days are formed in 3 categories (no zero return days, 2-5 zero return days, and 
more than 5 zero return days).  I then create 23 portfolios types based on size (𝑚𝑣𝑒), book-
to-market (𝑏𝑚𝑒) momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚) and nine liquidity measures.   
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I follow the procedure of portfolio formations in Fama and French (1993), using the 
mid breakpoint of NYSE firms for size.  Firms must continuously have 36 months returns 
and minimum month price above $5 to be included in the portfolios.  Portfolios are 
rebalanced every month based on the rankings of these liquidity measures.   
I use five models to compare their performance on pricing liquidity portfolios.  The 
models are: the Random Walk model, the Capital Asset Pricing model, the Fama-French 3-
Factor model, the Fama-French 4-Factor model, and the Fama-French 3-Factor augmented 
with the Amivest liquidity (𝑎𝑣𝑡) factor model (the Fama-French 3+𝑎𝑣𝑡 Factor model).   
1. The Random Walk Model: 𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡       (12) 
where 𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡  is the value weighted return of portfolio 𝑝 in month 𝑡, and 𝛼𝑝  is the 36-
month moving average of returns.   
2. The Capital Asset Pricing Model: 𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡   (13) 
Where 𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡  is the value weighted return of portfolio 𝑝 in month 𝑡, 𝑅𝑀,𝑡  is the value 
weighted market return in month 𝑡.  𝑅𝐹𝑡  is the one-month Treasury bill rate (from 
Ibbotson Associates). 
3. The Fama-French 3-Factor Model:   
𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝[𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡] + 𝑕𝑝[𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡] + 𝜀𝑡    (14) 
where 𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡  is the value weighted return of portfolio 𝑝 in month 𝑡, 𝑅𝑀,𝑡  is the value 
weighted market return in month 𝑡.  𝑅𝐹𝑡  is the one-month Treasury bill rate (from 
Ibbotson Associates). 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  and  𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  are the mimicking returns for the size (𝑆𝑀𝐵) 
and book-to-market equity (𝐻𝑀𝐿) factors in month 𝑡.  For details, please refer to 
Fama and French (1993).  The value weighted market returns, one-month Treasury 
bill rate, and factor returns are available in Fama-French’s website.   
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4. The Fama-Frech 4-Factor Model:   
𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝑕𝑝 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑝[𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡] + 𝜀𝑡  (15) 
where 𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡  is the value weighted return of portfolio 𝑝 in month 𝑡, 𝑅𝑀,𝑡  is the value 
weighted market return in month 𝑡.  𝑅𝐹𝑡  is the one-month Treasury bill rate (from 
Ibbotson Associates).  𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 , 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 , and 𝑀𝑜𝑚𝑡  are the mimicking returns for the size 
(𝑆𝑀𝐵), book-to-market equity (𝐻𝑀𝐿), and momentum (𝑀𝑜𝑚) factors in month 𝑡.  6 
value weighted portfolios formed on size and momentum (2x3) returns are used to 
construct the momentum factor. It is the average return on the two high prior 
return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios.  
Momentum factor returns are also available in Fama-French’s website.   
5. The Fama-French 3+𝑎𝑣𝑡 Factor Model:   
𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝑕𝑝 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑙𝑝[𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡] + 𝜀𝑡  (16) 
where 𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡  is the value weighted return of portfolio 𝑝 in month 𝑡, 𝑅𝑀,𝑡  is the value 
weighted market return in month 𝑡.  𝑅𝐹𝑡 is the one-month Treasury bill rate (from 
Ibbotson Associates).  𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 , 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 , and 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡  are the mimicking returns for the size 
(𝑆𝑀𝐵), book-to-market equity (𝐻𝑀𝐿), and the Amivest liquidity (𝑎𝑣𝑡) factors in 
month 𝑡.  The Amivest liquidity time-series (𝑎𝑣𝑡) factor is constructed the same way 
as momentum (𝑀𝑜𝑚).  6 value weighted portfolios returns formed on size and 
Amivest liquidity (2x3) are used to construct Amivest liquidity factor.  It is the 
average return on the two high Amivest liquidity portfolios minus the average 
return on the two low Amivest liquidity portfolios.   
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For convenience, the Fama-French 3-Factor model, the Fama-French 4-Factor model, and 
the Fama-French 3+𝑎𝑣𝑡 Factor model are named as the FF 3-Factor model, the FF 4-Factor 
model, and the FF 3+ 𝑎𝑣𝑡 Factor model hereafter. 
I use nine different periods to examine the difference of estimated average pricing 
error and estimated premium on the extreme deciles portfolios over time.  The nine 
different periods are: 1930-2006, 1976-2006, 1930-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-
1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, and 2001-2006.  They are shorthand expressed as:  30-06, 
76-06, 30-75, 76-80, 81-85, 86-90, 91-95, 96-00, and 01-06.  In these 7 periods (30-75, 76-
80, 81-85, 86-90, 91-95, 96-00, and 01-06), a time dummy (𝑑0 ,𝑑1, . . .𝑑7) is used to dummy 
the regressor(s) and intercept in addition to the original intercept and regressor(s).   
Let 𝑟𝑝 ,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑝 ,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 , and 𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡  
Take the FF 3-Factor model (Eq. (13)) for an example, the difference of returns between 
the least and the most liquid deciles portfolios is: 
𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡 = (𝛼𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 − 𝛼𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ) +  𝑏𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 − 𝑏𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞  𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓𝑡  
 +(𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 − 𝑠𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ) 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + (𝑕𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 − 𝑕𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ) 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + (𝜀𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡 − 𝜀𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡)  
       (17) 
where the subscripts Least Liq and Most Liq denote for the least and most liquid deciles 




Equation 17 can be rewritten as: 
𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡 = Δ𝛼 + (Δ𝑏)𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓𝑡 + (Δ𝑠) 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + (Δ𝑕) 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡   (17a) 
where Δ𝛼 is the difference of average pricing errors, and  Δ𝑏, Δ𝑠, and Δ𝑕 are the differences 
of the coefficients on the market, size, and book-to-market factors.   
Assuming that there is no pricing error, the regression equation is estimated as: 
(𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡) =   Δ𝑏 rmrft + 𝛥𝑠 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + Δ𝑕 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡     (17b) 
The test statistics for     is 
𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 = (𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡)  ℛ ′Σℛ       (18) 
Where ℛ is the (𝑘 × 1) vector of factor returns in the model, Σ is the variance-covariance 
matrix of 𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡 .   
If the transactions cost declines over time, the liquidity premium for holding 
securities should also decrease.  Thus, I use a rolling 36-month window in each month to 
examine the predicted difference in premia.  The abnormal return is defined as: 
 𝑎𝑏𝑝 ,𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑝 ,𝑡+1 − 𝑟 𝑝 ,𝑡          (19) 
where 𝑎𝑏𝑝 ,𝑡+1 is the abnormal return for portfolio 𝑝 at month 𝑡 + 1, 𝑟𝑝 ,𝑡+1 is the return for 
portfolio 𝑝 at month 𝑡 + 1, and 𝑟 𝑝 ,𝑡  is the predicted return for portfolio 𝑝 at month 𝑡 + 1.   
Drop subscript t for convenience, the predicted difference in abnormal returns on extreme 
portfolios is: 
Δ𝑎𝑏 = 𝑎𝑏𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 − 𝑎𝑏𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞          (20)  
𝑟𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 ,𝑡  
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The predicted difference of the premium on the liquidity extreme portfolios is: 
Δ𝑟 = 𝑟 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞 − 𝑟 𝑀𝑜𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑖𝑞          (21) 
The corresponding pseudo R-square is: 
𝑅2 = 1 − [ (Δ𝑎𝑏)2  (Δ𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑤
2 )] .        (22) 
where 𝑅2  is the pseudo R-square, (Δ𝑎𝑏)2 is the square of the predicted difference in 
abnormal returns on extreme portfolios, and  Δ𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑤
2  denotes the square of the difference of 
abnormal returns from the random walk model.   
To see whether the difference of the factor loadings on the extreme portfolios is 
statistically significant, I report these statistics in tables.  In addition, I graph the betas of 





4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 Panel A reports descriptive statistics of the eleven liquidity measures, 
factors returns, and lead returns for all common equities (share codes=10 and 11) from 
non-financial firms from 1926 to 2006.  Except for transaction cost measures [spread (𝑠𝑝), 
relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝)], all other measures have more than 2 million monthly observations 
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Table 1.  Panel A. Descriptive Statistics for Liquidity Measures, Factors, and Return: 1926-2006 




𝑎𝑣𝑡 Amivest 287.393 4.912 2,732 468k 2,222 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 Amivest (TS) 0.160 0.076 0.326 43.611 2,430 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 Amivest Variant 8.921 0.455 83.214 17,267 2,222 
𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 Amivest Variant (TS) 0.159 0.075 0.326 44.048 2,431 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 Amihud Ill-liq 16.577 0.344 526.809 400k 2,236 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 Amihud Ill-liq (TS) 0.073 0.018 1.013 621.254 2,234 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 Share Turnover 0.069 0.027 0.191 79.501 2,503 
𝑚𝑣𝑛 Mkt Value Turnover 0.070 0.028 0.215 87.385 2,502 
𝑠𝑝 Spread 0.447 0.261 2.902 648.813 1,238 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 Relative Spread 0.046 0.025 0.079 19 1,127 
𝑝𝑧𝑟 Prop. Zero Returns 0.257 0.190 0.235 1 2,504 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 Momentum Variable 0.014 0.011 0.051 2.158 2,213 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 Book-to-market 1.086 0.654 5.093 1,260.944 2,059 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 Mkt Value of Equity 757 mil 43 mil 6.45 bil 602 bil 2,504 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 Returns 0.013 0.000 0.185 23.997 2,435 
Notes: Data are monthly from 1926:01-2006:12.  All common equities (share codes=10, and 11) 
from non-financial firms with at least one non-missing return are initially considered.  Names of 




over the sample period2.  The Amivest liquidity ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡), the Amivest liquidity (variant) 
ratio (𝑎𝑚𝑣), and the Amihud illiquidity ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞) are more volatile than their time-series 
counterparts: The Amivest liquidity time-serese ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡), the Amivest liquidity 
(variant) time-series ratio (𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡), and the Amihud illiquidity time-series ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡).  The 
mean and median of Amivest liquidity ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡) are 287.393 and 4.192, respectively.  If 
we multiply it by 106 , for 1% price change, the dollar volume on average changes by 
$287,393,000 in a month.  For the median, the dollar volume changes by $4,192,000 for 1% 
price change. The mean and median for the Amivest liquidity time-serese ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡) are 
lower, .16 and .076, respectively.  That is, for 1% price change, the dollar volume changes 
by 16% and 7.6% of the market value of equity for the mean and median, respectively.   
The mean and median for the Amivest liquidity variant ratio (𝑎𝑚𝑣) are 8.921 and 
.455, respectively.  This says that the trading volume on average changes by 8,921,000 
shares for 1% change of price in a month if we multiply it by 106 . The trading volume on 
average changes by 455,000 shares for 1% change of price in a month.  The mean and 
median for the Amivest liquidity variant time-series ratio (𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡) are .159 and .0075. That 
is, the trading volume changes by 15.9% and 7.5% of end of month share outstanding for 
1% change of price, respectively for the mean and median.   
The mean and median for the Amihud illiquidity ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞) are 16.577 and .344.  If it 
is divided by 106 , price changes by .0016577% and .0000344% per dollar of daily trading 
volume for the mean and median.  The Amihud illiquidity time-series ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡) is smaller 
                                                          
2Bid and ask price data are available for NYSE when a closing price is missing between February 24, 1942 and 
December 27, 1992.  For NASDAQ, bid and ask price are reported since November 1, 1982 for all NADSAQ 





than the the Amihud illiquidity ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞).  The mean and median for the Amihud illiquidity 
time-series ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡) are .073 and .018.  That is, price changes by 7.3% and 1.8% per 
trading market value of equity.   
For share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛), the mean and median are .069 and .027.  That is, 
securities are traded .067 and .027 times of the shares outstanding in a month for the mean 
and average.  For market value turnover, the mean and median are .07 and .028.  That is, 
securities are traded .07 and .028 times of the market value of equity over a month for the 
mean and median.  The maximums for share turnover and market value turnover are 
79.501 and 87.385.  These are probably for small capitalization securities.   
As to the transaction cost measures, the mean and median of spread (𝑠𝑝) are 44.7 
cents and 26.1 cents per share, respectively.  The mean and median of relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝) 
are 4.6% and 2.5% of the closing price, respectively.  The maximums for spread and 
relative spread are 648.81 and 19, which are probably not the inside quotations for 
NYSE/AMEX before 1992.3   
The mean and median for proportion of zero return days (𝑝𝑧𝑟) are .257 and .19.  
The number of trading days in a month over the sample period is 22 on average.  If we 
multiply these numbers by 22, securities have zero returns for 5.645 and 4.18 days in a 
month for the mean and median.   
The mean and median for momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚) are .014 and .011. That is, the average 
prior 2 to 12 months non-missing returns for the mean and median are 1.4% and 1.1%, 
respectively.  The maximum for the momentum variable is 215.8%, which is probably for 
                                                          
3The inside quotation is the highest bid and the lowest ask for each trade date.  From 1992, bid and ask were 
set to 0 in CRSP if the available quote was unrepresentative of trading activity for NYSE and AMEX.  NASDAQ 
has used the inside quotation as the closing bid and ask since July 1980.   
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small cap securities.  For book-to-market (𝑏𝑚𝑒), the mean and median are 1.086 and .654.  
The book values are 1.086 and .654 times of the market value equity for the mean and 
median.  The maximum for book-to-market is 1,260.944, which is for the highly distressed 
firm.   
The market value of equity (𝑚𝑣𝑒) on average is $757 million, and the median is $43 
million.  Market value of equity has big range because of the extreme values of the big and 
small cap firms.  The mean and median for the return (𝑟𝑒𝑡) are 1.3% and 0%, respectively.   
Table 1 Panel B1 reports the Spearman rank correlations for the eleven liquidity 
measures, factors and lead returns over the whole sample period from 1926 to 2006.  The 
price impact measures, the Amivest liquidity ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡), the Amivest liquidity time-series 
ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡), the Amivest liquidity (variant) ratio (𝑎𝑚𝑣), the Amivest liquidity (variant) 
time-series ratio (𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡) and the Amihud illiquidity ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞), and the Amihud illiquidity 
time-series ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡), are highly correlated.  The Amivest liquidity, its variant, and time 
series ratios (𝑎𝑣𝑡, 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑚𝑣, and 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡) are correlated at least above 78%. These two 
measures, 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 and 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡, are correlated at 99.7%.  The illiquidity measures (such as 𝑖𝑙𝑞, 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑠𝑝, 𝑟𝑠𝑝, and 𝑝𝑧𝑟) are opposite to the liquidity measures (such as 𝑎𝑣𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡, 
𝑠𝑕𝑛, and 𝑚𝑣𝑛).  Thus, the correlations between illiquidity and liquidity measures are 
negative.  The Amihud illiquidity ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞), and the Amihud illiquidity time-series ratio 
(𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡) are negatively correlated with the Amivest liquidity, its variant, and time series ratios 
(𝑎𝑣𝑡, 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑚𝑣, and 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡) from -71.2% to -96.6%.   
Share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛) and market value turnover (𝑚𝑣𝑛) are highly correlated at 
99.8%, which cannot reject the null of a nearly perfect correlation (99.9%) at 1% level.  
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Table 1  Panel B1. Spearman Rank Correlations of Liquidity Measures, Factors and Return Variables: 1926-2006 
 
𝜌 𝑎𝑣𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑚𝑣 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑞 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 𝑠𝑕𝑛 𝑚𝑣𝑛 𝑠𝑝 𝑟𝑠𝑝 𝑝𝑧𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑚 𝑏𝑚𝑒 𝑚𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 1 0.770 0.891 0.773 -0.966 -0.728 0.587 0.582 -0.240 -0.823 -0.558 0.212 -0.342 0.917 0.039 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 
 
1 0.780 0.997 -0.735 -0.895 0.887 0.887 -0.323 -0.690 -0.455 0.181 -0.236 0.519 0.026 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 
  
1 0.781 -0.849 -0.712 0.708 0.705 -0.468 -0.717 -0.418 0.116 -0.393 0.763 0.012 
𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 
   
1 -0.739 -0.893 0.887 0.884 -0.321 -0.694 -0.456 0.180 -0.235 0.524 0.025 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 
    
1 0.802 -0.512 -0.508 0.245 0.841 0.518 -0.203 0.322 -0.862 -0.035 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 
     
1 -0.696 -0.696 0.322 0.752 0.340 -0.212 0.239 -0.454 -0.023 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 
      
1 0.998 -0.397 -0.464 -0.436 0.117 -0.259 0.424 -0.002 
𝑚𝑣𝑛 
       
1 -0.398 -0.458 -0.435 0.118 -0.259 0.419 -0.001 
𝑠𝑝 
        
1 0.379 0.278 0.063 0.109 -0.150 0.019 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 
         
1 0.658 -0.255 0.243 -0.775 -0.043 
𝑝𝑧𝑟 
          
1 -0.152 0.208 -0.537 -0.017 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 
           
1 0.066 0.155 0.033 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 
            
1 -0.311 0.049 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 
             
1 0.037 
𝑟𝑒𝑡                             1 
Notes: Data are monthly from 1926:01-2006:12.  All common equities (share codes=10, and 11) from non-financial firms with at least one 
non-missing return are initially considered.  Names of liquidity measures are in italics - refer to Appendix for definitions.  Returns are lead 
one period.  The number of observations for each variable follows from Table 1 Panel A.  The t statistics,(𝜌 − 𝜌)   1 −
𝜌2
5
 (𝑛 − 2)   , is 
used to test the null of a nearly perfect correlation (𝜌 = .999 ) between two rank variables.  The rank correlation (𝜌 ) of the pair (Share 
Turnover 𝑠𝑕𝑛 and Market Value Turnover 𝑚𝑣𝑛) cannot reject the null at 1% level, indicating a nearly perfect correlation (in bold).  Other 
pairs of the variables are statistically significantly rejecting the null of a nearly perfect correlation at 1% level.   
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These two measures are almost perfectly correlated.  Share and market value turnovers are 
correlated to the Amivest liquidity, its variants, and time-series ratios (𝑎𝑣𝑡, 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑚𝑣, and 
𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡) from 58.2% to 88.7%.  They are negatively correlated to the Amihud illiquidity ratio 
(𝑖𝑙𝑞), and the Amihud illiquidity time-series ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡) from -50.8% to -69.6%.   
Spread (𝑠𝑝) and relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝) are correlated at 37.9%, not so high as we 
would think.  Spread is negatively correlated with the Amivest liquidity, its variants, and 
time-series ratios (𝑎𝑣𝑡, 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑚𝑣, and 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡) from -24% to -46.8%.  As to its correlation 
with the Amihud illiquidity and time-series ratios (𝑖𝑙𝑞, and 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡), the correlations are 24.5% 
and 32.2%, respectively.  Spread is negatively correlated with share and market value 
turnovers at -39.7% and -39.8%, respectively.   
Relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝) has higher correlations with the Amivest liquidity, its variant, 
time-series, and the Amihud illiquidity and time-series ratios.  The correlations range from 
69% to 84.1% in absolute value.  Relative spread is moderately correlated with share and 
market value turnovers at -46.4% and -45.8%, respectively.   
Proportion of zero returns days (𝑝𝑧𝑟) is negatively correlated with the Amivest 
liquidity, its variant, and time-series ratios (𝑎𝑣𝑡, 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑚𝑣, and 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡) from -41.8% to -
55.8%.  It is positively correlated with the Amihud illiquidity and time-series ratios at 
51.8% and 34%, respectively.  Its correlations with share and market value turnovers are 
at -43.6% and -43.5%, respectively.  Transaction cost measures, spread (𝑠𝑝) and relative 
spread(𝑟𝑠𝑝), are correlated with proportion of zero return days at 27.8% and 65.8%, 
respectively.   
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Momentum variable is not highly correlated with these eleven liquidity measures 
(𝑎𝑣𝑡, 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑠𝑕𝑛, 𝑚𝑣𝑛, 𝑠𝑝, 𝑟𝑠𝑝, and 𝑝𝑧𝑟).  The correlation coefficients 
are positive for liquidity measures and negative for illiquidity measures.  The correlations 
are between 6.3% and 25% in absolute values.  Book-to-market is negatively correlated 
with liquidity measures and positively correlated with illiquidity measures.  Firms with low 
book-to-market ratios generally have higher (lower) liquidity (illiquidity) ratios.   
The market value of equity (𝑚𝑣𝑒), or called size, is highly correlated with the 
Amivest liquidity (𝑎𝑣𝑡), the Amivest liquidity variant (𝑎𝑚𝑣), and the Amihud illiquidity 
(𝑖𝑙𝑞) at 91.7%, 76.3%, and -86.2%, respectively.  Their time-series ratios (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡, and 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡) are not so highly correlated with size, and the correlations are 51.9%, 52.4%, and -
45.4%, respectively.  Share and market value turnovers are correlated with size at 42.4% 
and 41.9%.  Spread is negatively correlated with size at -15%, while relative spread has a 
high negative correlation with size at -77.5%.  Proportion of zero return days is negatively 
correlated with size at -53.7%.  Momentum and book-to-market are correlated with size at 
15.5% and -31.1%, respectively.   
The lead one period return is correlated with the Amivest liquidity, its time-series, 
variant and time series ratio at 3.9%, 2.6%, 1.2%, and 2.5%, respectively;.  It is negatively 
correlated with the Amihud illiquidity and time series ratio at -3.5% and -2.3%.  Share and 
market value turnovers have low negative correlation with lead returns, and the 
correlations are -.2% and -.1%.  Spread and relative spread are correlated with lead returns 
at 1.9% and -4.3%, respectively.  Proportion of zero return days is negatively correlated 
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with lead returns at -1.7%.  Momentum, book-to-market, and market value of equity are 
correlated with lead returns at 3.3%, 4.9%, and 3.7%, respectively.   
The rank correlations of the liquidity measures, factors, and returns for sub-periods 
(1926-1975, 1976-1985, 1986-1995, and 1996-2006) are reported in Table 1 Panels B2 to 
B5.  In the sub-period from 1926 to 1975, two pairs of rank correlations, 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 and 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡, 
and 𝑚𝑣𝑛 and 𝑠𝑕𝑛, are nearly perfectly correlated.  The test statistics cannot reject the null 
of a nearly perfect correlation (.999) at 1% level.  Most of the rank correlations are smaller 
than those in the whole period (1926-2006).  In the sub-period from 1976 to 1985, Most of 
the rank correlations are also smaller than those in the whole period.  In these two sub-
periods, the correlations between relative spread and Amiverst liquidity, the variant, and 
Amihud illiquidity (𝑎𝑣𝑡, 𝑎𝑚𝑣, and 𝑖𝑙𝑞) are larger than those in the whole period.  In the last 
two sub-periods (1986-1995, and 1996-2006), the rank correlations between the liquidity 
measures and momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚) are larger than those in the all-year period.   
Table 1 Panel C reports rolling 60-month rank correlations of liquidity measures, 
factors, and returns from 1930 to 2006.  The averages of rolling rank correlations for 914 
months are reported in each cell.  The numbers in brackets are the minimum and maximum 
of 914 rolling rank correlations.  A few rolling correlations have different signs if we 
compare with the correlations in Table 1 Panel B1.  These with different signs are: .014 for 
spread (𝑠𝑝) and Amivest liquidity ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡), -.059 for spread (𝑠𝑝) and Amihud illiquidity 
ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞), -.14 for proportion of zero return days (𝑝𝑧𝑟) and spread (𝑠𝑝), .079 for book-to-
market (𝑏𝑚𝑒) and spread (𝑠𝑝), and .18 for market value of equity (𝑚𝑣𝑒) and spread (𝑠𝑝).  
What causes the sign changes is the opposite sign between the minimum and maximum of  
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Table 1  Panel B2. Spearman Rank Correlations of Liquidity Measures, Factors and Return Variables: 1926-1975 
 
𝜌 𝑎𝑣𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑚𝑣 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑞 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 𝑠𝑕𝑛 𝑚𝑣𝑛 𝑠𝑝 𝑟𝑠𝑝 𝑝𝑧𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑚 𝑏𝑚𝑒 𝑚𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 1 0.566 0.913 0.570 -0.983 -0.528 0.302 0.297 -0.015 -0.952 -0.489 0.196 -0.352 0.875 0.022 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 
 
1 0.583 0.998 -0.531 -0.922 0.874 0.874 -0.228 -0.728 -0.401 0.254 -0.019 0.253 0.040 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 
  
1 0.586 -0.880 -0.511 0.410 0.406 -0.386 -0.871 -0.332 0.122 -0.293 0.758 0.011 
𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 
   
1 -0.536 -0.920 0.873 0.871 -0.229 -0.733 -0.399 0.254 -0.022 0.255 0.040 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 
    
1 0.557 -0.255 -0.250 -0.080 0.939 0.482 -0.199 0.356 -0.877 -0.024 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 
     
1 -0.732 -0.732 0.071 0.682 0.244 -0.265 0.067 -0.144 -0.022 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 
      
1 0.998 -0.301 -0.485 -0.371 0.177 0.057 0.093 0.015 
𝑚𝑣𝑛 
       
1 -0.299 -0.481 -0.372 0.177 0.059 0.093 0.015 
𝑠𝑝 
        
1 0.135 -0.170 0.047 -0.179 0.162 -0.004 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 
         
1 0.558 -0.219 0.442 -0.799 -0.028 
𝑝𝑧𝑟 
          
1 -0.176 0.179 -0.443 -0.016 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 
           
1 0.114 0.110 0.049 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 
            
1 -0.355 0.058 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 
             
1 0.029 
𝑟𝑒𝑡                             1 
Notes: Data are monthly from 1926:01-1975:12.  All common equities (share codes=10, and 11) from non-financial firms with at least one 
non-missing return are initially considered.  Names of liquidity measures are in italics - refer to Appendix for definitions.  Returns are lead 
one period.  The number of observations for each variable follows from Table 1 Panel A.  The t statistics,(𝜌 − 𝜌)   1 −
𝜌2
5
 (𝑛 − 2)   , is 
used to test the null of a nearly perfect correlation (𝜌 = .999 ) between two rank variables.  The rank correlations (𝜌 ) of two pairs 
(Amivest Liquidit 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 and Amivest Liquidity variant 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡, and Share Turnover 𝑠𝑕𝑛 and Market Value Turnover 𝑚𝑣𝑛) cannot reject the 
null at 1% level, indicating a nearly perfect correlation (in bold).  Other pairs of the variables are statistically significantly rejecting the 




Table 1  Panel B3. Spearman Rank Correlations of Liquidity Measures, Factors and Return Variables: 1976-1985 
 
𝜌 𝑎𝑣𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑚𝑣 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑞 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 𝑠𝑕𝑛 𝑚𝑣𝑛 𝑠𝑝 𝑟𝑠𝑝 𝑝𝑧𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑚 𝑏𝑚𝑒 𝑚𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 1 0.679 0.884 0.683 -0.955 -0.603 0.474 0.468 -0.180 -0.896 -0.553 0.151 -0.218 0.923 0.042 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 
 
1 0.710 0.985 -0.648 -0.859 0.912 0.906 -0.318 -0.690 -0.443 0.069 -0.080 0.479 0.010 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 
  
1 0.711 -0.856 -0.656 0.572 0.569 -0.469 -0.763 -0.340 0.046 -0.302 0.756 0.002 
𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 
   
1 -0.653 -0.856 0.909 0.905 -0.314 -0.692 -0.446 0.066 -0.080 0.480 0.009 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 
    
1 0.715 -0.399 -0.393 0.272 0.880 0.456 -0.138 0.210 -0.823 -0.033 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 
     
1 -0.618 -0.619 0.432 0.696 0.114 -0.173 0.190 -0.300 -0.007 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 
      
1 0.986 -0.388 -0.405 -0.425 0.056 -0.101 0.459 0.000 
𝑚𝑣𝑛 
       
1 -0.392 -0.402 -0.423 0.058 -0.101 0.457 0.001 
𝑠𝑝 
        
1 0.254 -0.055 0.164 0.046 -0.013 0.049 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 
         
1 0.359 -0.409 0.112 -0.800 -0.044 
𝑝𝑧𝑟 
          
1 -0.166 0.129 -0.544 -0.026 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 
           
1 0.098 0.106 0.033 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 
            
1 -0.187 0.058 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 
             
1 0.034 
𝑟𝑒𝑡                             1 
Notes: Data are monthly from 1976:01-1985:12.  All common equities (share codes=10, and 11) from non-financial firms with at least one 
non-missing return are initially considered.  Names of liquidity measures are in italics - refer to Appendix for definitions.  Returns are lead 
one period.  The number of observations for each variable follows from Table 1 Panel A.  The t statistics,(𝜌 − 𝜌)   1 −
𝜌2
5
 (𝑛 − 2)   , is 
used to test the null of a nearly perfect correlation (𝜌 = .999 ) between two rank variables.  All pairs of the variables are statistically 
significantly rejecting the null of a nearly perfect correlation at 1% level.   
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Table 1  Panel B4. Spearman Rank Correlations of Liquidity Measures, Factors and Return Variables: 1986-1995 
 
𝜌 𝑎𝑣𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑚𝑣 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑞 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 𝑠𝑕𝑛 𝑚𝑣𝑛 𝑠𝑝 𝑟𝑠𝑝 𝑝𝑧𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑚 𝑏𝑚𝑒 𝑚𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 1 0.789 0.908 0.793 -0.940 -0.707 0.560 0.553 0.101 -0.886 -0.610 0.253 -0.211 0.920 0.072 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 
 
1 0.816 0.997 -0.753 -0.854 0.812 0.812 -0.073 -0.706 -0.368 0.247 -0.201 0.511 0.051 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 
  
1 0.818 -0.876 -0.764 0.651 0.646 -0.162 -0.769 -0.466 0.182 -0.265 0.767 0.049 
𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 
   
1 -0.756 -0.851 0.813 0.807 -0.069 -0.708 -0.370 0.246 -0.198 0.517 0.050 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 
    
1 0.838 -0.437 -0.432 -0.045 0.883 0.463 -0.221 0.191 -0.779 -0.058 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 
     
1 -0.567 -0.567 0.135 0.738 0.229 -0.200 0.180 -0.408 -0.032 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 
      
1 0.997 -0.168 -0.377 -0.376 0.170 -0.235 0.361 0.022 
𝑚𝑣𝑛 
       
1 -0.172 -0.373 -0.373 0.171 -0.238 0.353 0.025 
𝑠𝑝 
        
1 0.020 -0.136 0.117 -0.014 0.236 0.036 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 
         
1 0.451 -0.305 0.219 -0.831 -0.051 
𝑝𝑧𝑟 
          
1 -0.213 0.171 -0.569 -0.048 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 
           
1 0.020 0.223 0.031 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 
            
1 -0.179 0.026 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 
             
1 0.071 
𝑟𝑒𝑡                             1 
Notes: Data are monthly from 1986:01-1995:12.  All common equities (share codes=10, and 11) from non-financial firms with at least one 
non-missing return are initially considered.  Names of liquidity measures are in italics - refer to Appendix for definitions.  Returns are lead 
one period.  The number of observations for each variable follows from Table 1 Panel A.  The t statistics,(𝜌 − 𝜌)   1 −
𝜌2
5
 (𝑛 − 2)   , is 
used to test the null of a nearly perfect correlation (𝜌 = .999 ) between two rank variables.  The rank correlations (𝜌 ) of two pairs 
(Amivest Liquidit 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 and Amivest Liquidity variant 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡, and Share Turnover 𝑠𝑕𝑛 and Market Value Turnover 𝑚𝑣𝑛) cannot reject the 
null at 1% level, indicating a nearly perfect correlation (in bold).  Other pairs of the variables are statistically significantly rejecting the 




Table 1  Panel B5. Spearman Rank Correlations of Liquidity Measures, Factors and Return Variables: 1996-2006 
 
𝜌 𝑎𝑣𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑚𝑣 𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 𝑖𝑙𝑞 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 𝑠𝑕𝑛 𝑚𝑣𝑛 𝑠𝑝 𝑟𝑠𝑝 𝑝𝑧𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑚 𝑏𝑚𝑒 𝑚𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 1 0.824 0.935 0.829 -0.989 -0.859 0.601 0.593 -0.142 -0.826 -0.571 0.235 -0.316 0.941 0.049 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 
 
1 0.837 0.996 -0.807 -0.944 0.840 0.840 -0.292 -0.710 -0.430 0.225 -0.247 0.603 0.040 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 
  
1 0.840 -0.935 -0.876 0.685 0.680 -0.358 -0.771 -0.523 0.142 -0.316 0.836 0.036 
𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡 
   
1 -0.811 -0.940 0.840 0.832 -0.290 -0.716 -0.432 0.224 -0.243 0.612 0.040 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 
    
1 0.886 -0.594 -0.587 0.174 0.832 0.584 -0.227 0.319 -0.935 -0.046 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 
     
1 -0.788 -0.787 0.331 0.765 0.499 -0.216 0.273 -0.681 -0.036 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 
      
1 0.996 -0.319 -0.477 -0.356 0.153 -0.278 0.403 -0.001 
𝑚𝑣𝑛 
       
1 -0.319 -0.469 -0.349 0.153 -0.280 0.392 0.000 
𝑠𝑝 
        
1 0.481 0.298 0.071 0.000 -0.039 0.000 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 
         
1 0.662 -0.245 0.224 -0.773 -0.052 
𝑝𝑧𝑟 
          
1 -0.187 0.183 -0.521 -0.023 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 
           
1 0.031 0.211 0.015 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 
            
1 -0.305 0.036 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 
             
1 0.048 
𝑟𝑒𝑡                             1 
Notes: Data are monthly from 1996:01-2006:12.  All common equities (share codes=10, and 11) from non-financial firms with at least one 
non-missing return are initially considered.  Names of liquidity measures are in italics - refer to Appendix for definitions.  Returns are lead 
one period.  The number of observations for each variable follows from Table 1 Panel A.  The t statistics,(𝜌 − 𝜌)   1 −
𝜌2
5
 (𝑛 − 2)   , is 
used to test the null of a nearly perfect correlation (𝜌 = .999 ) between two rank variables.  All pairs of the variables are statistically 
significantly rejecting the null of a nearly perfect correlation at 1% level.   
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Table 1  Panel C  Rolling 60-Month Rank Correlations of Liquidity Measures, Factors and Return Variables: 1930-2006 
 

























































































































































































































































Notes: Numbers in brackets are minimum and maximum of rolling 60-month rank correlations from 1930:11 to 2006:12.   
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the rolling rank correlations.  The average rolling correlations between proportion of zero 
return days (𝑝𝑧𝑟) and other liquidity measures are smaller than those in the average 
correlations in Table 1 Panel B1.  This table provides information of dynamic rank 
correlations for liquidity measure, factor returns and returns, and the range of the 
correlations as well.   
Table 1 Panel D reports the percent of firms in the most and least liquid quartiles 
over years by the Amivest liquidity (𝑎𝑣𝑡), the Amihud illiquidity (𝑖𝑙𝑞), share turnover 
(𝑠𝑕𝑛), spread (𝑠𝑝), relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝), and proportion of zero return days (𝑝𝑧𝑟).  Firms 
measured by the proportion of zero return days (𝑝𝑧𝑟) are stratified into 3 categories: firms 
with no zero return days, 2-5 zero returns days, and more than 5 zero return days in a 
month.  The number in bold is the percentage of firms in the most liquid quartile.  For the 
period between 1926 and 2006, the percentage of firms is reported in 5-year intervals.  
From 1996 to 2006, yearly statistics are also reported.  The most liquid quartile for 
liquidity measures, such as the Amivest liquidity (𝑎𝑣𝑡) and share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛), is the 4th 
quartile.  On the other hand, the most liquid is the first quartile/category for illiquidity 
measures, such as the Amihud illiquidity (𝑖𝑙𝑞), spread (𝑠𝑝), relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝), and 
proportion of zero return days (𝑝𝑧𝑟).   
In general, the percentage of firms in the most liquid category increases 
dramatically, while that in the least liquid category declines from 2001 to 2006.  The 
percentage of firms in the most liquid quartile by Amivest liquidity (𝑎𝑣𝑡) starts at 38% in 
the first 5 years, declining to 3% and 6% in the periods from 1971 to 1980.  Between 1981 
and 2006, it rises from 21% to 71%.  The percentage of firms in the least liquid quartile by 
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1926 - 1930 20 - 38 33 - 17 18 - 36 0 - 65 33 – 16 9 - 29 
1931 - 1935 55 - 8 6 - 53 37 - 14 1 - 51 10 – 46 4 - 45 
1936 - 1940 46 - 7 6 - 40 36 - 11 2 - 49 11 – 27 3 - 40 
1941 - 1945 40 - 6 5 - 32 43 - 6 7 - 50 8 – 27 1 - 52 
1946 - 1950 30 - 4 3 - 25 35 - 4 5 - 59 Na 3 - 39 
1951 - 1955 17 - 9 9 - 15 35 - 4 9 - 42 Na 3 - 44 
1956 - 1960 21 - 7 7 - 20 38 - 4 7 - 49 Na 6 - 33 
1961 - 1965 26 - 7 7 - 27 35 - 5 5 - 56 Na 5 - 42 
1966 - 1970 17 - 13 13 - 20 21 - 13 na Na 10 - 28 
1971 - 1975 54 - 3 4 - 39 53 - 3 na Na 7 - 59 
1976 - 1980 54 - 6 9 - 25 57 - 4 na Na 6 - 66 
1981 - 1985 27 - 21 24 - 17 30 - 14 3 - 20 11 – 18 5 - 65 
1986 - 1990 17 - 29 27 - 28 16 - 24 7 - 27 5 – 36 4 - 67 
1991 - 1995 18 - 34 28 - 32 12 - 35 7 - 32 7 – 39 5 - 54 
1996 11 - 43 35 - 24 6 - 47 7 - 31 9 – 31 6 - 42 
1997 10 - 43 36 - 22 6 - 47 12 - 23 14 - 27 10 - 35 
1998 10 - 39 34 - 23 5 - 48 20 - 17 18 - 23 16 - 26 
1999 9 - 42 38 - 20 6 - 51 24 - 16 21 - 21 20 - 23 
2000 10 - 39 38 - 19 6 - 56 25 - 14 25 - 22 27 - 19 
1996 - 2000 10 - 41 36 - 22 6 - 50 17 - 20 17 – 25 16 - 29 
2001 18 - 35 34 - 28 9 - 45 46 - 6 33 - 20 40 - 11 
2002 18 - 39 39 - 27 10 - 46 59 - 3 42 - 15 48 - 8 
2003 11 - 53 52 - 18 9 - 53 82 - 1 61 – 7 50 - 5 
2004 5 - 65 64 - 10 6 - 61 89 - 2 75 – 2 56 - 3 
2005 5 - 69 67 - 9 4 - 65 91 – 1 78 – 1 56 - 3 
2006 4 - 71 70 - 8 3 - 69 93 – 1 83 – 1 58 - 2 
2001 - 2006 11 - 54 53 - 17 7 - 56 75 – 3 60 – 8 51 - 5 
Overall 25 -25 25 -25 25 -25 25 -25 25 -25  
Notes:  Data are monthly from 1926:01-2006:12.  All common equities (share codes=10, and 11) 
from non-financial firms with at least one non-missing return are initially considered.  Names of 
liquidity measures are in italics - refer to Appendix for definitions. Categories are based on 1st 
(appearing first) and 4th (appearing second) unconditional quartiles (i.e., from 1926-2006).  
Quartile of each measure considered the most liquid is in bold.  Each entry is the percentage of 
firms for each date that fall into a quartile.  na – CRSP does not provide data for these date ranges.  
Overall category is percentages over all firm months in the first of fourth quartile.  It is also the sum 
of the each entry in the table times each dates fraction of the total number of firm months.  1not 
quartiles, most liquid category are firms with no zero return days in a month and least liquid are 
those that have more than five days with zero returns in a month.  Overall for this measure are the 





the Amivest liquidity (𝑎𝑣𝑡) increases from 20% to 54% between 1926 and 1980.  It 
continuously falls from 27% to 4% since 1981.  Firms measured by share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛), 
Amihud illiquidity (𝑖𝑙𝑞), spread (𝑠𝑝), relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝), and proportion of zero return 
days (𝑝𝑧𝑟) have similar patterns.  The percentage of firms in the most liquid quartile by 
Amihud illiquidity (𝑖𝑙𝑞) increases from 24% to 70% since 1981, while that in the least 
liquid quartile drops from 32% to 8% since 1991.  For share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛), the percent of 
firms in the most liquid quartile begins at 36%, declines to 4% in 1980, and increases 
dramatically from 14% to 69% in the period between 1981 and 2006.  For those in the 
least liquid category of share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛), the percentage of firms starts at 18%, rises to 
57% in 1980, and drops to 3% in 2006.   
For spread (𝑠𝑝) measure, the percentage of firm in the most liquid quartile 
increases from 0% to 7% in 1995, and jumps to 93% in 2006.  That in the category of high 
spreads starts at 65%, goes down to 32% in 1995, and drops to 1% in 2006.  As to the 
relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝) measure, the percentage of firms in the most liquid quartile begins at 
33%, decreases to 7% in 1995, and increase to 83% in 2006.  For proportion of zero return 
days (𝑝𝑧𝑟), the percentage of firms with no zero return days starts at 9%, declines to 6% in 
1996, and steady increases to 58% in 2006.  The percentage of firms with more than 5 zero 
return days begins at 29%, increases to 67% in 1990, and falls to 2% in 2006.  The 
percentage of firms rises in the most liquid category and declines in the most liquid 
category from 1996 to 2006.   
Figure 1A shows the percent of firms in the most liquid category by year using these 



















Figure 1A.  Percent of Firms in Most Liquid Category by Year
Amihud 1st Quartile









of firms in the most liquid category are not in large magnitudes except the period between 
1926 and 1938, and the period from 1966 to 1971.  Since 1980, the percent of firms in the 
most liquid category by the Amihud illiquidity (𝑖𝑙𝑞) and share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛) increases 
dramatically, although it dips slightly from 2000 to 2001.  Since 1996, it increases almost 
exponentially by spread (𝑠𝑝), relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝), and proportion of zero return days 
(𝑝𝑧𝑟).  This shows that the market becomes more liquid since 1996.   
Table 1 Panel E1 reports the medians of the Amivest liquidity time-series ratio 
(𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡), the Amihud illiquidity time-series ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡), share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛), spread (𝑠𝑝), 
relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝), and proportion of zero return days (𝑝𝑧𝑟) in the period from 1926 to 
2006.  For the period between 1926 and 2006, medians are reported in 5-year intervals.  
From 1996 to 2006, medians are reported on the yearly basis.  The median of the Amivest 
liquidity time-series ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡) starts at .115, decreases to .019 in 1980, and steady 
increases to .399 in 2006.  The median of share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛) is .043, declines to .004 in 
1980, and increases to .123 in 2006.  The increase of liquidity ratios indicates that the 
market becomes more liquid.   
For the Amihud illiquidity time-series ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡), the median is .013 from 
beginning, rises to .022 in 1980, and declines to .003 in 2006.  The median of spread (𝑠𝑝) 
begins at 63.5 cents per share, falls to 35.5 cents per share in 1995, and further declines to 
3 cents per share in 2006.  The median of relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝) is 1.7% of the closing price 
from 1926 to 1930, increases to 4.1% in 1995, and declines to .2% in 2006.  The median of 
























1926 - 1930 0.115 0.013 0.043 0.635 0.017 0.136 
1931 - 1935 0.023 0.052 0.014 0.471 0.047 0.200 
1936 - 1940 0.031 0.037 0.014 0.450 0.029 0.185 
1941 - 1945 0.036 0.031 0.011 0.469 0.032 0.231 
1946 - 1950 0.042 0.029 0.013 0.521 Na 0.190 
1951 - 1955 0.062 0.021 0.012 0.375 Na 0.192 
1956 - 1960 0.054 0.024 0.012 0.458 Na 0.150 
1961 - 1965 0.051 0.027 0.013 0.500 Na 0.190 
1966 - 1970 0.064 0.022 0.020 na Na 0.143 
1971 - 1975 0.023 0.035 0.008 na Na 0.273 
1976 - 1980 0.019 0.022 0.004 na Na 0.333 
1981 - 1985 0.077 0.015 0.022 0.283 0.027 0.318 
1986 - 1990 0.098 0.017 0.034 0.299 0.039 0.304 
1991 - 1995 0.114 0.018 0.047 0.355 0.041 0.238 
1996 0.155 0.012 0.068 0.364 0.034 0.190 
1997 0.154 0.012 0.068 0.319 0.030 0.158 
1998 0.137 0.013 0.069 0.262 0.026 0.136 
1999 0.148 0.011 0.074 0.234 0.024 0.100 
2000 0.141 0.010 0.087 0.222 0.023 0.091 
1996 - 2000 0.147 0.012 0.072 0.281 0.028 0.136 
2001 0.110 0.015 0.062 0.135 0.019 0.048 
2002 0.122 0.012 0.064 0.103 0.014 0.045 
2003 0.204 0.007 0.080 0.060 0.007 0.043 
2004 0.299 0.004 0.100 0.041 0.004 0.000 
2005 0.352 0.003 0.108 0.036 0.003 0.000 
2006 0.399 0.003 0.123 0.030 0.002 0.000 
2001 - 2006 0.214 0.006 0.086 0.058 0.007 0.000 
Notes:  Data are monthly from 1926:01-2006:12.  All common equities (share codes=10, and 11) 
from non-financial firms with at least one non-missing return are initially considered.  Names of 




(5.24 days/month) in 1995, and falls to 0 in 2006.  The decrease of these illiquidity ratios 
also shows that the market becomes more liquid from 1996 to 2006.   
Table 1 Panel E2 reports medians of the Amivest liquidity time-series ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡), 
the Amihud illiquidity time-series ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡), share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛), spread (𝑠𝑝), relative 
spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝), and proportion of zero return days (𝑝𝑧𝑟) for firms in the 2nd to 4th size 
quartiles.  The size breakpoints are by NYSE firms.  By convention, small size firms usually 
have higher transactions cost.  Removing the first quartile size firms from the sample 
should give us higher (lower) medians of liquidity (illiquidity) measures.  The median of 
the Amivest liquidity time-series ratio (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡) is at .151, decreases to .071 in 1980, and rises 
sharply to .863 in 2006.  The median of share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛) begins at .05, falls to .017 in 
1980, and climbs to .233 in 2006.   
The median of Amihud illiquidity time-series ratio (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡) is .010 from the beginning, 
increases to .016 in 1980, and declines to .004 in 2006.  The median of spread (𝑠𝑝) begins 
at 63 cents per share, decreases to 41.1 cents per share, and further declines to 4.1 cents 
per share in 2006.  The median of relative spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝) is 1.3% of the closing price from 
1926 to 1930, increases to 1.8% in 1995, and declines to .1% in 2006.  The median of 
proportion of zero return days (𝑝𝑧𝑟) starts at .12 (2.64 days/month), rises to .238 (3.15 
days/month) in 1995, and decreases to .013 (.29 days/month) in 2006.  Most of the 
medians reported in Table 1 Panel E2 are higher (lower) than those in Table 1 Panel E1 of 
the liquidity (illiquidity) measures.   
Figure 1B shows the median spread and relative spread for all firms and for the 2nd 
to 4th size quartiles by year.  The median relative spread for all firms is higher than that for 
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1926 - 1930 0.151 0.010 0.050 0.630 0.013 0.120 
1931 - 1935 0.032 0.041 0.018 0.491 0.031 0.160 
1936 - 1940 0.036 0.034 0.014 0.515 0.022 0.160 
1941 - 1945 0.039 0.030 0.010 0.542 0.025 0.200 
1946 - 1950 0.043 0.030 0.012 0.604 na 0.174 
1951 - 1955 0.062 0.021 0.011 0.450 na 0.182 
1956 - 1960 0.052 0.025 0.011 0.500 na 0.143 
1961 - 1965 0.055 0.023 0.012 0.500 na 0.143 
1966 - 1970 0.063 0.022 0.016 na na 0.105 
1971 - 1975 0.048 0.026 0.014 na na 0.150 
1976 - 1980 0.071 0.016 0.017 na na 0.190 
1981 - 1985 0.129 0.011 0.036 0.289 0.016 0.174 
1986 - 1990 0.182 0.008 0.051 0.325 0.021 0.174 
1991 - 1995 0.205 0.007 0.059 0.411 0.018 0.143 
1996 0.321 0.018 0.134 0.468 0.018 0.136 
1997 0.337 0.014 0.137 0.418 0.015 0.098 
1998 0.314 0.014 0.149 0.409 0.014 0.059 
1999 0.318 0.011 0.186 0.406 0.015 0.057 
2000 0.294 0.011 0.216 0.363 0.014 0.046 
1996 - 2000 0.238 0.005 0.093 0.352 0.012 0.050 
2001 0.359 0.010 0.203 0.247 0.010 0.020 
2002 0.417 0.008 0.204 0.181 0.007 0.014 
2003 0.548 0.006 0.205 0.083 0.003 0.016 
2004 0.660 0.004 0.210 0.049 0.001 0.015 
2005 0.761 0.003 0.209 0.049 0.001 0.015 
2006 0.863 0.004 0.233 0.041 0.001 0.013 
2001 - 2006 0.482 0.002 0.149 0.042 0.002 0.000 
Notes:  Data are monthly from 1926:01-2006:12.  All common equities (share codes=10, and 11) 
from non-financial firms with at least one non-missing return are initially considered.  Names of 
liquidity measures are in italics - refer to Appendix for definitions.  Size breakpoints are by NYSE 




































Figure 1B.  Median Spread and Relative Spread by Year
Median Relative Spread %
Median Relative 







the 2nd to 4th size quartiles.  They move in the same direction, start at 1.6% and 1.2%, and 
jump to 9% for all firms and 5.8% for the 2nd to 4th size quartiles in 1933.  The median 
relative spread then plunges to 2% for all firms and 1.6% for the 2nd to 4th size quartiles in 
1937, and rises to 3.6% and 2.8% in 1939, respectively.  Bid and ask price data are not 
available for relative spread from 1942 to 1982.  From 1982 to 2006, the medians spread 
and relative spread are hump shaped curves.  They reach high in 1992 and then decline.  
The median relative spread for all firms increases from 1.6% in 1983 to 5.5% in 1992, and 
then declines to .2% in 2006.  The median spread for the 2nd to 4th size quartiles increases 
from 1.1% in 1983 to 2.6% in 1992, and then falls to .1% in 2006.   
The median spread for all firms is 56 cents in 1926, increases to 77 cents in 1931, 
decreases to 38 cents in 1936, and reaches the highest of 90 cents in 1947.  It falls to 38 
cents in 1953 and bounces to 50 cents in 1959.  The median spread for the 2nd to 4th size 
quartiles moves in the same direction as that for all firms, and is higher by 10 cents in the 
period between 1926 and 1960.  The median spread for all firms and for the 2nd to 4th size 
quartiles is 27 cents in 1983, and reaches to 41 cents for all firms in 1992 and 48 cents for 
the 2nd to 4th size quartiles in 1993.  The median spread declines to less than 2 cents for all 
firms and for the 2nd to 4th size quartiles in 2006.  This graph again shows that the 
transactions cost falls sharply since 1996.   
Figures 1C to 1G show the median of these liquidity measures (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑠𝑕𝑛, 𝑠𝑝, 
and 𝑟𝑠𝑝) for all firms and for firms in the 2nd to 4th size quartiles by year.  The median of 

























































































4th size quartiles is graphed in dash line.  For these measures (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑠𝑕𝑛, and 𝑟𝑠𝑝), the 
median for firms in the 2nd to 4th quartiles is higher (lower) than that for all firms in term of 
liquidity (illiquidity).  The median of spread (𝑠𝑝) for firms in the 2nd to 4th quartiles is 
higher than that for all firms.  Although firms in the 2nd to 4th size quartiles have higher 
transactions cost than all firms, their proportional spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝) is lower than that of all 
firms.  This indicates that large size firms are more liquid than small size firms.  The median 
of the Amivest liquidity time-series (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡) ratio and of share turnover (𝑠𝑕𝑛) is the mirror 
image of the median of the Amihud illiquidity time-series (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡) ratio.  That is, when the 
median of the liquidity measure is high, the median of illiquidity measure is low in the 
same time.  The median of these liquidity (illiquidity) measures also increases (decreases) 
over time.  This is consistent with the graphs shown in Figures 1A and 1B.   
Figures 1C to 1G also show that market liquidity is lower when there is an usual 
event, or the economy is in recession.  Some noticeable periods are the Gulf War from 1990 
to 1991, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, and the bubble burst of U.S. technology firms 
from 2000 to 2001.  In these periods, the median of these measures (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, and 𝑠𝑕𝑛) 
declines (rises) in terms of liquidity (illiquidity).  For the median spread (𝑠𝑝) and relative 
spread (𝑟𝑠𝑝), it increases from 1990 to 1991, and is not so noticeable in the periods of the 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 and bubble burst of technology firms from 2000 to 2001.  In 
general, the changes of the median of the liquidity/illiquidity measures (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑠𝑕𝑛, 𝑠𝑝, 
and 𝑟𝑠𝑝) are more salient than that of the measure for firms in the 2nd to 4th quartiles.  
Large firms are not affects much in term of liquidity in these periods.  When there is a 




4.2 Empirical Tests 
Table 2 Panel A shows the average returns on the extreme portfolios.  Table 2 Panel 
B reports the descriptive statistics of the factor returns (the market, size, book-to-market, 
momentum, and the liquidity factors constructed by the Amivest Liquidity ratio and the 
Amivest Liquidity time-series ratio, separately).  Tables 3 and 4 report the difference in 
estimated premia and in predicted premia on the extreme portfolios by four different 
models.  Tables 5 shows rolling 36-month market, size, book-to-market, and momentum 
betas in the FF 4-Factor model.  From Tables 2 to 5, the adjusted R-square and the pseudo 
R-square are reported in raw numbers.  From Tables 2 to 4, other statistics are reported in 
percentage on the monthly basis.  Statistics significant at 5% level are reported in shaded 
gray cells, while those significant at 1% level are shown in bold in shaded gray cells.   
The extreme portfolios are the 1st and 10th deciles by the rankings of liquidity, size 
(𝑚𝑣𝑒), book-to-market (𝑏𝑚𝑒), or momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚) measures.  Portfolios with the lowest 
ranks of these measures are in the 1st deciles, while those with the highest ranks are in the 
10th deciles.  Thus, the 1st deciles are the least liquid portfolios, while the 10th deciles are 
the most liquid.  In Table 2 Panel A, the difference of average returns on the least and most 
liquid (𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑞) deciles is positive (between 1.09% and 1.41% per month) and 
significant at 5% level during the periods of 1976-1980 and 2001-2006. Although the 
premium on the extreme liquidity (𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣,𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡) portfolios becomes negative 
(between -1.17% and -2.5% per month) and is significant at 5% level during the period of 
1996-2000, it does not persist to the period from 2001 to 2006.  The difference of average 
returns on the extreme (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡) portfolios is all negative (between -.38% and -2.5%) and 
significant at 5% level in the periods of 1930-2006, 1976-2006, 1991-1995, and 1996-
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Table 2  Panel A. Average Return on Extreme Portfolios by Date 
 
     
Date Range 
   Portfolio Rank 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 Big  1.60 1.39 1.73 3.13 0.74 -0.24 1.66 1.06 1.92 
 
Small  0.86 1.01 0.75 1.07 1.14 1.25 1.24 1.51 0.09 
 
Dif. Ret 0.74 0.38 0.98 2.07 -0.40 -1.49 0.42 -0.46 1.83 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 High  1.43 1.70 1.26 2.17 2.12 1.05 1.82 1.60 1.49 
 
Low 0.74 0.81 0.70 0.99 0.22 1.32 1.25 1.60 -0.36 
 
Dif. Ret 0.69 0.89 0.56 1.17 1.90 -0.27 0.57 0.00 1.85 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 Up  1.60 1.67 1.55 3.06 0.90 1.07 2.33 2.50 0.44 
 
Down 0.47 0.43 0.50 0.70 0.25 -0.05 0.98 -0.07 0.77 
 
Dif. Ret 1.12 1.24 1.05 2.36 0.65 1.12 1.35 2.57 -0.33 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 Lst. Liq. 1.02 1.08 0.98 2.33 1.27 0.31 1.04 0.26 1.26 
 
Mst. Liq 0.88 1.02 0.79 1.05 1.09 1.24 1.29 1.60 0.08 
 
Dif. Ret 0.14 0.06 0.19 1.28 0.18 -0.93 -0.25 -1.34 1.18 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 Lst. Liq. 0.93 1.14 0.79 2.30 1.50 0.48 1.02 0.44 1.17 
 
Mst. Liq 0.89 1.01 0.80 0.97 1.14 1.18 1.29 1.61 0.08 
 
Dif. Ret 0.04 0.13 -0.02 1.33 0.36 -0.70 -0.28 -1.17 1.09 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 Lst. Liq. 1.07 1.22 0.96 2.46 1.50 0.44 1.17 0.47 1.32 
 
Mst. Liq 0.88 1.02 0.78 1.05 1.08 1.24 1.29 1.61 0.08 
 
Dif. Ret 0.19 0.20 0.17 1.41 0.42 -0.80 -0.11 -1.14 1.24 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 Lst. Liq. 0.82 1.07 0.64 2.23 1.25 0.78 0.90 0.56 0.83 
 
Mst. Liq 0.95 1.21 0.78 1.90 0.59 0.63 2.00 2.00 0.33 
 
Dif. Ret -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 0.33 0.66 0.15 -1.11 -1.44 0.50 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 Lst. Liq. 0.69 0.83 0.59 2.17 1.16 0.56 0.87 -0.13 0.48 
 
Mst. Liq 1.07 1.35 0.88 1.78 1.23 0.80 1.91 2.37 0.27 
 
Dif. Ret -0.38 -0.52 -0.29 0.39 -0.07 -0.24 -1.04 -2.50 0.20 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 Lst. Liq. 0.76 0.90 0.66 1.72 0.96 0.68 0.99 0.22 0.86 
 
Mst. Liq 0.99 1.21 0.85 1.46 0.97 0.87 1.70 2.11 0.34 
 
Dif. Ret -0.24 -0.31 -0.19 0.26 -0.01 -0.19 -0.71 -1.90 0.52 
𝑠𝑝 Lst. Liq. 0.76 0.95 0.64 na na 0.33 1.34 1.09 0.66 
 
Mst. Liq 1.01 1.14 0.93 na na 0.26 1.73 2.06 0.08 
 
Dif. Ret -0.25 -0.18 -0.29 na na 0.06 -0.39 -0.97 0.58 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 Lst. Liq. 0.80 0.77 0.83 na na -0.06 1.18 0.56 0.83 
 
Mst. Liq 0.69 1.09 0.11 na na 1.20 1.89 1.52 -0.01 
 
Dif. Ret 0.10 -0.33 0.73 na na -1.26 -0.72 -0.96 0.83 
Notes:  The difference in average returns of portfolios denoted statistics with p-value ≤ .05 are in 
shaded gray cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold in shaded gray cells.  Statistics reported are 
percentages on the monthly basis. Lst Liq. stands for the least liquid portfolio, and Mst. Liq. denotes 
for the most liquid portfolio.  Dif. Ret denotes for the difference in returns between the extreme 
portfolios.  Names of liquidity measures are in italics - refer to Appendix for definitions.  𝑚𝑣𝑒, 𝑏𝑚𝑒, 
and 𝑚𝑜𝑚 denote size, book-to-market, and momentum variables, respectively.  Sample or sub-




2000.  The premium on the extreme 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 portfolios has a different pattern.  The difference 
of average returns on the size (𝑚𝑣𝑒), book-to-market (𝑏𝑚𝑒), and momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚) 
extreme portfolios is positive and significant at 5% level for at least 4 periods , except the 
significant negative premium on size extreme portfolios during the period of 1986-1990.  
The difference on these extreme portfolios (𝑚𝑣𝑒, 𝑏𝑚𝑒,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑚) is between .74% and 
2.36% per month.   
Table 2 Panel B reports the mean and standard deviation of factor returns in each 
period.  Factor are the value-weighted market (𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓), size (𝑠𝑚𝑏), book-to-market (𝑕𝑚𝑙), 
momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚), the Amivest liquidity (𝑎𝑣𝑡), and the Amivest liquidity time-series 
factors (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡).  The Amivest liquidity factor (𝑎𝑣𝑡), and the Amivest liquidity time-series 
factor (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡) are the average returns on the two high liquidity portfolios minus the average 
returns on the two low liquidity portfolios, computed the same way as the momentum 
factor (𝑚𝑜𝑚).  Except the 𝑎𝑣𝑡 factor in the period of 2001-2006,  𝑎𝑣𝑡 and 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 factor 
returns are all negative, between -.02% and -.93%, across other periods.  Except the 
negative size factor returns (-.63% and -.22%) in the periods of 1986-1990 and 1996-2000, 
other factors (𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓, 𝑠𝑚𝑏, 𝑕𝑚𝑙,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑚) are all positive (between .02% and 1.47%) in all 
periods.  In most of periods, the returns on the Amivest liquidity factor (𝑎𝑣𝑡), and the 
Amivest liquidity time-series factor (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡) have an opposite sign to those on other factors.   
Table 3 Pane A shows the difference in estimated premia on extreme portfolios 
using the capital asset pricing model.  The estimated premium is negative (between -.47% 
and .18%) and most significant at 5% level and the difference of estimated alphas is 
insignificant for (𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑠𝑕𝑛,𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑠𝑝,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑠𝑝) portfolios.  However, the low adjusted R-
square, between .00 and .40, shows that the capital asset pricing model cannot explain 
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Table 2 Panel B.  Factor Portfolio Descriptives 
 
     
Date Range 
   Factor Stat 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓 mean 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.81 0.36 0.45 1.00 0.98 0.26 
 
std 5.43 4.36 6.04 4.52 4.24 5.35 2.84 4.86 4.15 
𝑠𝑚𝑏 mean 0.29 0.28 0.30 1.20 0.31 -0.63 0.30 -0.22 0.68 
 
std 3.38 3.21 3.50 2.73 2.12 2.41 2.30 5.41 2.96 
𝑕𝑚𝑙 mean 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.08 1.12 0.02 0.44 0.14 0.82 
 
std 3.63 3.05 3.98 2.61 2.88 2.18 2.36 4.67 2.94 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 mean 0.70 0.85 0.61 1.47 0.53 0.79 0.85 1.39 0.20 
 
std 4.73 4.15 5.08 3.78 3.16 3.02 2.59 5.17 5.79 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 mean -0.10 -0.21 -0.02 -0.11 -0.27 -0.20 -0.39 -0.74 0.37 
 
std 3.45 3.68 3.28 4.30 3.04 2.50 2.82 5.48 3.25 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 mean -0.26 -0.36 -0.20 -0.03 -0.24 -0.15 -0.68 -0.93 -0.15 
 
std 2.92 2.86 2.96 1.74 1.44 1.76 2.09 5.33 2.86 
Notes: Statistics (mean and standard deviation) reported are percentages on the monthly basis.  
𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑓, 𝑠𝑚𝑏, 𝑕𝑚𝑙, and 𝑚𝑜𝑚 are the market factor, size, book-to-market, and momentum factor 
returns, respectively.  𝑎𝑣𝑡 and 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 are liquidity factor portfolios constructed by the Amivest 
liquidity and the Amivest liquidity time-series ratios.  The liquidity factor portfolio is constructed 
the same way as that for the momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚) factor.  Sample or sub-sample periods are short 




Table 3 Panel A.  CAPM Differences in Estimated Premia on Extreme Portfolios 
     
Date Range 
   Portfolio Stat 30-06 76-06 30-75* 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 Δ𝛼  0.36 0.26 0.52 1.71 -0.45 -1.51 0.48 -0.63 1.75 
small-big Δ𝑟 0.38 0.12 0.47 0.22 0.25 0.15 -0.34 -0.08 0.35 
 𝑅 2 0.16 0.02 0.19 
      𝑏𝑚𝑒 Δ𝛼  0.38 0.95 0.12 0.94 2.11 -0.24 0.71 0.36 1.81 
high-low Δ𝑟 0.31 -0.06 0.44 0.10 -0.02 0.10 -0.41 -0.61 0.34 
 𝑅 2 0.16 0.01 0.25 
      𝑚𝑜𝑚 Δ𝛼  1.30 1.14 1.32 1.84 0.61 1.04 1.01 2.16 -0.14 
up-down Δ𝑟 -0.18 0.10 -0.27 0.60 -0.07 0.00 0.51 0.56 -0.35 
 𝑅 2 0.04 0.01 0.10 
      𝑎𝑣𝑡 Δ𝛼  0.14 0.07 0.19 1.10 0.14 -0.93 -0.02 -1.06 1.18 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.18 0.04 0.00 -0.23 -0.28 0.01 
 𝑅 2 0.00 0.00 0.02 
      𝑎𝑚𝑣 Δ𝛼  0.10 0.19 0.04 1.16 0.34 -0.68 0.04 -0.85 1.13 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 0.18 -0.01 -0.04 -0.28 -0.29 -0.08 
 𝑅 2 0.01 0.01 0.04 
      𝑖𝑙𝑞 Δ𝛼  0.17 0.21 0.14 1.22 0.36 -0.80 0.08 -0.84 1.24 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.19 0.07 0.01 -0.21 -0.32 0.02 
 𝑅 2 0.00 0.00 0.02 
      𝑠𝑕𝑛 Δ𝛼  0.28 0.30 0.26 0.50 0.77 0.30 -0.15 -0.25 0.83 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.41 -0.43 -0.40 -0.06 -0.28 -0.26 -0.72 -0.97 -0.57 
 𝑅 2 0.36 0.28 0.40 
      𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 Δ𝛼  -0.17 -0.35 -0.07 0.35 -0.10 -0.21 -0.45 -1.78 0.34 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.21 -0.17 -0.22 0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.46 -0.59 -0.26 
 𝑅 2 0.15 0.08 0.20 
      𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 Δ𝛼  -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 0.56 0.02 -0.12 -0.20 -1.14 0.65 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.19 -0.25 -0.17 -0.26 -0.11 -0.12 -0.41 -0.66 -0.22 
 𝑅 2 0.15 0.19 0.18 
      𝑠𝑝 Δ𝛼  0.23 0.40 0.24 na 0.24 0.35 0.11 -0.47 0.77 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.30 -0.33 -0.29 na -0.29 -0.26 -0.33 -0.33 -0.36 
 𝑅 2 0.33 0.22 0.33 na 
     𝑟𝑠𝑝 Δ𝛼  -0.04 -0.29 0.37 na 0.37 -0.86 -0.17 -0.47 0.79 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.03 -0.18 0.02 na 0.02 -0.18 -0.56 -0.50 0.06 
 𝑅 2 0.00 0.06 0.04 na 
     Notes:  Statistics by the Capital Asset Pricing model are reported in percentage except 𝑅 2.  Δ𝛼  is the 
difference in estimated intercepts on extreme portfolios, and Δ𝑟 is the difference in estimated 
returns on extreme portfolios.  𝑅 2 denotes for the adjusted R-square.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .05 
are in shaded gray cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold in shaded gray cells.  𝑅 2 is the same 
for these sub-periods because each sub-period is a time dummy in the regression.  “least-most” 
denotes for the difference of the least and most liquid portfolios in term of intercepts or returns. 
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cross-sectional variations of portfolio returns well.  For book-to-market (𝑏𝑚𝑒) and 
momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚) extreme portfolios, the significant difference in alphas (between .95% 
and 2.16%) also indicates that the capital asset pricing model leaves unexplained returns.   
Using the FF 3-Factor model to estimate the difference in expected returns between 
extreme portfolios, I find that the adjusted R-square improves in Table 3 Panel B.  It ranges 
between .20 and .71 for the least and most liquid portfolios 
(𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑖𝑙𝑞, 𝑠𝑕𝑛,𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑠𝑝,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑠𝑝) for all 9 periods.  However, the difference in 
estimated pricing error (between -.98% and -2.66%) is significant at least at 5% level 
during the periods of 1976-2006 and 1996-2000.  Still, the FF 3-Factor model is not a 
perfect model.   
If the cost of trading securities declines, the liquidity premium for holding securities 
should also decrease.  However, the difference in estimated liquidity premia does not 
monotonically decline across each sub-period (30-75, 76-80, 81-85, 86-90, 91-95, 96-00, 
and 01-06) as the transactions cost falls over time.  For these liquidity portfolios 
(𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑖𝑙𝑞,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑠𝑝), the difference of estimated premia is all positive (between .17% 
and 1.06%) and significant at 1% level in the periods of 1930-1975, 1976-1980, 1996-
2000, and 2001-2006.  On the other hand, the difference of estimated premia is all negative 
(between --.58% and -.16%) and significant at 1% level for these liquidity portfolios 
(𝑠𝑕𝑛,𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑝) in the periods of 1930-1975 and 1986-1990.  Surprisingly, the 
difference in estimated premium is positive and significant for all extreme liquidity 
portfolios from 2001 to 2006.  The adjusted R-square for the size and book-to-market 
extreme portfolios ranges from .64 to .86.  The difference of estimated premia for size 
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Table 3 Panel B.  FF3-Factor Differences in Estimated Premia on Extreme Portfolios 
  
   
Date Range 
   Portfolio Stat 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 Δ𝛼  -0.20 -0.19 -0.01 0.14 -1.07 -0.64 -0.27 -0.06 0.50 
small-big Δ𝑟 0.94 0.56 0.99 0.50 -0.01 1.34 0.69 0.88 0.19 
 𝑅 2 0.84 0.82 0.86 
      𝑏𝑚𝑒 Δ𝛼  -0.21 -0.04 -0.33 -0.09 0.39 -0.01 -0.55 -0.04 -0.06 
high-low Δ𝑟 0.90 0.93 0.90 1.13 0.49 1.03 1.09 0.82 1.02 
 𝑅 2 0.81 0.64 0.82 
      𝑚𝑜𝑚 Δ𝛼  1.45 1.26 1.41 1.18 1.60 1.00 1.27 3.08 -1.47 
up-down Δ𝑟 -0.33 -0.02 -0.37 1.08 -0.73 -0.10 0.19 -0.53 1.20 
 𝑅 2 0.11 0.07 0.17 
      𝑎𝑣𝑡 Δ𝛼  -0.10 -0.48 -0.01 -0.11 -0.65 -0.11 -0.55 -1.32 0.07 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.24 0.53 0.20 1.05 0.42 -0.10 0.41 0.54 0.58 
 𝑅 2 0.34 0.70 0.39 
      𝑎𝑚𝑣 Δ𝛼  -0.08 -0.31 -0.10 0.07 -0.25 0.08 -0.45 -1.09 0.11 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.13 0.44 0.08 0.98 0.32 -0.28 0.28 0.34 0.58 
 𝑅 2 0.29 0.71 0.36 
      𝑖𝑙𝑞 Δ𝛼  -0.09 -0.35 -0.07 0.00 -0.47 0.04 -0.39 -1.14 0.12 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.28 0.55 0.24 1.06 0.46 -0.09 0.37 0.57 0.58 
 𝑅 2 0.36 0.70 0.40 
      𝑠𝑕𝑛 Δ𝛼  0.26 -0.27 0.31 0.46 -0.01 0.21 -0.56 -1.44 0.19 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.39 0.14 -0.45 0.23 0.54 -0.44 -0.33 0.04 0.22 
 𝑅 2 0.41 0.51 0.51 
      𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 Δ𝛼  -0.20 -0.78 -0.05 0.01 -0.35 -0.04 -0.86 -2.66 -0.40 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.18 0.26 -0.23 0.72 0.11 -0.45 -0.05 0.19 0.53 
 𝑅 2 0.19 0.26 0.30 
      𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 Δ𝛼  -0.12 -0.51 -0.03 0.62 -0.15 0.24 -0.60 -1.86 -0.25 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.12 0.19 -0.16 -0.07 -0.06 -0.58 0.00 0.02 0.67 
 𝑅 2 0.20 0.37 0.28 
      𝑠𝑝 Δ𝛼  0.22 -0.14 0.27 na 0.27 0.51 -0.09 -1.22 -0.43 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.29 0.23 -0.33 na -0.33 -0.53 -0.15 0.31 0.95 
 𝑅 2 0.35 0.40 0.44 na 
     𝑟𝑠𝑝 Δ𝛼  -0.29 -0.98 0.05 na 0.05 -0.52 -0.65 -1.38 -0.63 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.22 0.63 0.17 na 0.17 -0.04 0.05 0.88 0.97 
 𝑅 2 0.29 0.37 0.35 na 
     Notes:  Statistics by the FF 3-Factor model are reported in percentages except 𝑅 2.  Δ𝛼  is the 
difference in estimated intercepts on extreme portfolios, and Δ𝑟 is the difference in estimated 
returns on extreme portfolios.  𝑅 2 denotes for the adjusted R-square.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .05 
are in shaded gray cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold in shaded gray cells.  𝑅 2 is the same 
for these sub-periods because each sub-period is a time dummy in the regression.  “least-most” 
denotes for the difference of the least and most liquid portfolios in term of intercepts or returns. 
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(𝑚𝑣𝑒) and book-to-market (𝑏𝑚𝑒) is positive and significant 1% level except the period 
from 1981 to 1985.  The difference of estimated pricing error for the extreme momentum 
(𝑚𝑜𝑚) portfolios is significant at 1% level in the periods of 1930-2006, 1976-2006, and 
1930-1975.  Furthermore, the low adjusted R-square, between.07 and .17, also indicates 
low model fitting performance on the extreme momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚) portfolios.  This is 
expected because the FF 3-Factor model does not include the momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚) factor.   
Table 3 Panel C reports the difference in estimated premia using the FF 4-Factor 
model.  The FF 4-Factor model does a better job on pricing size (𝑚𝑣𝑒), book-to-market 
(𝑏𝑚𝑒), and momentum (𝑚𝑜𝑚) portfolios.  For all nine periods, the difference in estimated 
pricing errors (alphas) for the extreme (𝑚𝑣𝑒, 𝑏𝑚𝑒, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑚) portfolios is significant at 
5% level in only these two periods: 1981-1985 and 2001-2006.  The adjusted R-square is 
between .64 and .87.  For all extreme liquidity portfolios, the adjusted R-square does not 
improve much, which is between .29 and .73.  A similar pattern can be found as compared 
to the estimates of the FF 3-Factor model in Table 3 Panel B.  The difference in estimated 
premia on these extreme liquidity portfolios (𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑞) is positive (between .09% 
and 1.03%) and significant at 1% level in the periods of 1930-2006, 1976-2006, 1976-
1980, and 2001-2006.  For another group of extreme portfolios (𝑠𝑕𝑛,𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑝), the 
difference in estimated premia is negative, from -.64% to -.10%, and significant at 5% level 
in the periods of 1930-2006 and 1930-1975.  The sign of the difference of estimated 
premium is different between these two groups of extreme portfolios.  From 1976 to 2006, 
the difference of estimated premia is positive (between.25% and .43%) at 5% significance 
level for all extreme liquidity portfolios.  The difference of estimated pricing error on these 
extreme portfolios (𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑖𝑙𝑞,𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑠𝑝) is negative, between-.23% and -.77%, 
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Table 3 Panel C.  FF4 Factor Differences in Estimated Premia on Extreme Portfolios 
  
   
Date Range 
   Portfolio Stat 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 Δ𝛼  -0.04 -0.18 0.20 -0.08 -1.03 -0.67 -0.22 -0.14 0.42 
small-big Δ𝑟 0.78 0.56 0.76 0.88 -0.03 1.32 0.69 1.08 0.19 
 𝑅 2 0.85 0.82 0.87 
      𝑏𝑚𝑒 Δ𝛼  -0.12 0.04 -0.24 -0.21 0.27 -0.01 -0.48 0.24 -0.11 
high-low Δ𝑟 0.82 0.86 0.80 1.33 0.61 1.00 1.05 0.60 1.04 
 𝑅 2 0.81 0.64 0.83 
      𝑚𝑜𝑚 Δ𝛼  -0.13 0.01 -0.17 -0.32 0.05 0.20 0.04 0.39 -1.01 
up-down Δ𝑟 1.25 1.23 1.38 1.34 0.70 1.12 1.04 1.24 1.34 
 𝑅 2 0.81 0.81 0.83 
      𝑎𝑣𝑡 Δ𝛼  0.00 -0.35 0.11 0.09 -0.46 -0.16 -0.46 -0.83 0.06 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.14 0.40 0.07 0.95 0.23 -0.09 0.34 0.12 0.54 
 𝑅 2 0.35 0.73 0.40 
      𝑎𝑚𝑣 Δ𝛼  -0.05 -0.29 0.00 0.11 -0.19 -0.02 -0.39 -0.85 0.14 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.09 0.43 -0.03 1.03 0.28 -0.21 0.25 0.17 0.51 
 𝑅 2 0.29 0.71 0.36 
      𝑖𝑙𝑞 Δ𝛼  -0.01 -0.23 0.04 0.20 -0.28 -0.02 -0.32 -0.68 0.12 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.19 0.43 0.13 0.94 0.28 -0.05 0.33 0.18 0.53 
 𝑅 2 0.36 0.72 0.41 
      𝑠𝑕𝑛 Δ𝛼  0.32 -0.30 0.49 0.60 -0.01 0.09 -0.51 -0.96 0.11 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.45 0.16 -0.64 0.23 0.55 -0.37 -0.34 -0.34 0.23 
 𝑅 2 0.41 0.51 0.52 
      𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 Δ𝛼  -0.13 -0.77 0.11 -0.10 -0.34 -0.21 -0.73 -2.41 -0.44 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.25 0.25 -0.41 0.95 0.11 -0.32 -0.14 0.03 0.51 
 𝑅 2 0.19 0.26 0.31 
      𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 Δ𝛼  0.01 -0.42 0.16 0.53 0.11 0.15 -0.50 -1.45 -0.29 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.24 0.10 -0.36 0.16 -0.31 -0.54 -0.06 -0.28 0.64 
 𝑅 2 0.22 0.38 0.30 
      𝑠𝑝 Δ𝛼  0.04 -0.28 0.13 na 0.13 0.25 -0.18 -0.89 -0.30 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.10 0.39 -0.18 na -0.18 -0.22 -0.10 -0.10 0.88 
 𝑅 2 0.37 0.41 0.47 na 
     𝑟𝑠𝑝 Δ𝛼  -0.16 -0.68 0.06 na 0.06 -0.68 -0.65 -0.42 -0.72 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.05 0.30 0.13 na 0.13 0.12 0.06 -0.05 1.04 
 𝑅 2 0.30 0.46 0.37 na 
     Notes:  Statistics by the FF 4-Factor model are reported in percentage except 𝑅 2.  Δ𝛼  is the 
difference in estimated intercepts on extreme portfolios, and Δ𝑟 is the difference in estimated 
returns on extreme portfolios.  𝑅 2 denotes for the adjusted R-square.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .05 
are in shaded gray cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold in shaded gray cells.  𝑅 2 is the same 
for these sub-periods because each sub-period is a time dummy in the regression.  “least-most” 
denotes for the difference of the least and most liquid portfolios in term of intercepts or returns. 
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at 5% significance level.  This model does not price liquidity extreme portfolios well.  In 
each of the 5-year periods after 1975 to 2000, the difference of expected premia on 
extreme portfolio (𝑠𝑝 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡) is negative at 1% significance level in the periods of 1981-
1985 and 1986-1990, respectively.  In the period of 2001-2006, the difference in estimated 
premia on all extreme portfolios, except size(𝑚𝑣𝑒), is all positive (between .51% and 
1.04%) at 5% significance level.  This shows that the liquidity premium does not decline in 
the sample period.   
Table 3 Panel D reports the difference in estimated premia by the FF 3-Factor 
augmented with the Amivest liquidity (𝑎𝑣𝑡) factor.  Its adjusted R-square improves 
comparing to the FF 3-Factor model.  However, this model does not fit well on momentum 
portfolios because it does not include the momentum factor.  For the extreme liquidity 
portfolios, the adjusted R-square is between .39 and .75.  The pattern and magnitude of 
changes are similar as that of the FF 4-Factor model.  The difference in estimated premia on 
extreme portfolios (𝑎𝑣, 𝑖𝑙𝑞,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑠𝑝) is positive while that on the extreme portfolios 
(𝑠𝑕𝑛,𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑝) is negative and significant at 1% in the periods of 1930-2006 and 
1930-1975.  The difference in estimated premia is positive and significant at 5% on the 
extreme portfolios (𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑖𝑙𝑞, 𝑠𝑝 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑠𝑝). Still, the difference in estimated pricing 
error is negative (between -2.16% and -.20%) and significant at 5% level in the periods of 
1976-2006 and 1996-2000.  The FF 3-Factor augmented with 𝑎𝑣𝑡 factor also leaves 
significant unexplained returns on the extreme liquidity portfolios.  The difference in 
estimated preimia is significant at least at 5% level in most of the periods after 1975.  For 
the extreme portfolios (𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑞), the difference in estimated pemia is negative 
and significant at 5% level in the periods of 1976-1980, 1981-1985, and 1986-1990.  The 
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Table 3 Panel D. FF 3+𝑎𝑣𝑡 Factor Differences in Estimated Premia on Extreme Portfolios 
  
   
Date Range 
   Portfolio Stat 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 Δ𝛼  -0.20 -0.18 0.00 0.15 -1.11 -0.65 -0.28 -0.08 0.50 
small-big Δ𝑟 0.94 0.55 0.98 0.50 0.05 1.34 0.70 0.92 0.19 
 𝑅 2 0.84 0.82 0.86 
      𝑏𝑚𝑒 Δ𝛼  -0.22 -0.09 -0.33 -0.09 0.28 -0.01 -0.58 -0.04 -0.06 
high-low Δ𝑟 0.91 0.98 0.90 1.13 0.59 1.03 1.12 0.82 1.02 
 𝑅 2 0.81 0.64 0.82 
      𝑚𝑜𝑚 Δ𝛼  1.40 1.09 1.40 0.99 1.01 0.98 0.99 2.85 -1.47 
up-down Δ𝑟 -0.28 0.15 -0.31 1.19 -0.41 0.04 0.37 -0.49 1.28 
 𝑅 2 0.14 0.10 0.20 
      𝑎𝑣𝑡 Δ𝛼  -0.03 -0.36 0.01 -0.01 -0.52 -0.12 -0.46 -1.14 0.07 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.17 0.42 0.12 1.04 0.69 -0.29 0.48 0.63 0.47 
 𝑅 2 0.49 0.75 0.57 
      𝑎𝑚𝑣 Δ𝛼  -0.02 -0.20 -0.08 0.15 -0.19 0.07 -0.36 -0.90 0.11 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.06 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.65 -0.45 0.34 0.40 0.47 
 𝑅 2 0.46 0.77 0.56 
      𝑖𝑙𝑞 Δ𝛼  -0.02 -0.23 -0.05 0.10 -0.35 0.04 -0.30 -0.96 0.12 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.21 0.43 0.16 1.05 0.73 -0.27 0.43 0.65 0.46 
 𝑅 2 0.49 0.74 0.56 
      𝑠𝑕𝑛 Δ𝛼  0.34 -0.05 0.34 0.57 0.07 0.17 -0.35 -1.01 0.18 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.48 -0.09 -0.54 0.21 0.85 -0.58 -0.40 -0.13 0.12 
 𝑅 2 0.54 0.59 0.63 
      𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 Δ𝛼  -0.11 -0.56 -0.03 0.06 -0.29 -0.09 -0.66 -2.16 -0.40 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.27 0.04 -0.33 0.77 0.47 -0.59 -0.09 -0.04 0.42 
 𝑅 2 0.42 0.41 0.52 
      𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 Δ𝛼  -0.04 -0.31 -0.01 0.69 0.10 0.21 -0.40 -1.38 -0.26 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.19 -0.01 -0.23 -0.06 0.04 -0.72 -0.05 -0.21 0.57 
 𝑅 2 0.40 0.50 0.47 
      𝑠𝑝 Δ𝛼  0.24 -0.09 0.27 na 0.27 0.51 -0.09 -1.20 -0.43 
least-most Δ𝑟 -0.33 0.18 -0.37 na -0.37 -0.63 -0.07 0.43 0.89 
 𝑅 2 0.39 0.40 0.49 na 
     𝑟𝑠𝑝 Δ𝛼  -0.24 -0.88 0.08 na 0.08 -0.53 -0.54 -1.26 -0.63 
least-most Δ𝑟 0.15 0.53 0.07 na 0.07 -0.30 0.12 1.04 0.87 
 𝑅 2 0.43 0.39 0.54 na 
     Notes:  Statistics by the FF3+avt Factor model are reported in percentage except 𝑅 2.  Δ𝛼  is the 
difference in estimated intercepts on extreme portfolios, and Δ𝑟 is the difference in estimated 
returns on extreme portfolios.  𝑅 2 denotes for the adjusted R-square.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .05 
are in shaded gray cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold in shaded gray cells.  𝑅 2 is the same 
for these sub-periods because each sub-period is a time dummy in the regression.  “least-most” 
denotes for the difference of the least and most liquid portfolios in term of intercepts or returns. 
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difference of estimated pemia on extreme portfolios (𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑖𝑙𝑞, 𝑠𝑕𝑛,𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑝) 
is negative (between -.29% and -.72%) and significant at 5% level in the period of 1986-
1990.  The difference in estimated premia changes to positive on the extreme portfolios 
(𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑞)  and is significant at 1% level in the period of 1996-2000.  In the 
period of 2001-2006, the difference of estimated premia on extreme portfolios 
(𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑖𝑙𝑞,𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑠𝑝,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑠𝑝) is all positive (between .47% and .89%) at 5% level.  
The positive premium on the extreme liquidity portfolios again is evident of the existence 
of liquidity premium from 2001 to 2006.   
Figures 2A to 2I shows the difference of rolling 36-month alphas on extreme 
momentum and liquidity portfolios (𝑚𝑜𝑚,𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑠𝑕𝑛, 𝑖𝑙𝑞, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑠𝑝, 𝑟𝑠𝑝,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑧𝑟) using 
the 36-month moving average, the FF 3-Factor model, the FF 4-Factor model, and the 
augmented FF 3-Factor with 𝑎𝑣𝑡 factor from 1976 to 2006.  The 36 moth moving-average is 
the difference of 36-month moving average returns between the lowest and highest ranks 
of portfolios.  The difference of rolling 36-month alphas on extreme portfolios in the FF 3-
Factor model, the FF 4-Factor model, and the FF 3+𝑎𝑣𝑡 factor represents the difference of 
pricing error.  In Figure 2A, the extreme momentum portfolios can be explained better by 
the FF 4-Factor model because it includes the momentum factor and the difference of 
rolling alphas is smaller than the other FF 3-Factor and FF 4-Factor models.   
Figures 2B to 2I exhibit similar patterns on the difference of 36-month rolling alphas 
on the extreme liquidity portfolios (𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑠𝑕𝑛, 𝑖𝑙𝑞, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑠𝑝, 𝑟𝑠𝑝, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑧𝑟).  Thus, I 
discuss 3 of them to conserve space.  In Figure 2B, the difference of 36-month moving 
average returns between the least and most liquid 𝑎𝑣𝑡 portfolios is positive before 1986.  It 
varies between 0% and 1.9% per month, which is the positive premium between the least 
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and most liquid portfolios.  From 1987 to 1998, the premium hovers between -1.4% and 
.6% per month.  The liquidity premium declines further to -2.4% in 1999, and goes up from 
-2% in 2001 to 1.8% in 2004.  Then the premium is volatile around .6% to 1.4% since 2004.  
The differences of 36-month rolling alphas for the FF 3-Factor, FF 4-Factor, and FF3+ 𝑎𝑣𝑡 
factor models are similar in term of magnitude (between -1.4% and .5%) from 1976 to 
2006.  This indicates that these models have similar performance in pricing extreme 
liquidity portfolios.   
As to the extreme portfolios of 𝑠𝑕𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, the difference in 36-month rolling 
alphas for the FF 3-Factor, FF 4-Factor, and FF3+ 𝑎𝑣𝑡 factor models varies between -.7% 
and 1.1% before 1986.  The magnitude is slightly larger than that on 𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑞 
extreme portfolios.  There is still a dip in premium from 1998 to 2001, and then it increases 
dramatically from -3.6% in 2001 to 3.4% in 2003.  For the extreme portfolios of 
(𝑠𝑝 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑠𝑝), the difference of rolling alphas in the FF 3-Factor, FF 4-Factor, and FF3+ 𝑎𝑣𝑡 
factor models is larger than that in the 36-month moving average from 1990 to 1993.  The 
liquidity premium exhibits the same pattern as that discussed above.   
Table 4 Panel A reports the 36-month CAPM predicted differences in premia on 
extreme portfolios.  The pseudo R-square is low, between -.10 and .39 on the liquidity 
portfolios.  The significant difference of abnormal returns for 𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑖𝑙𝑞, 𝑠𝑕𝑛,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 
extreme portfolios at 5% level also indicates that CAPM cannot explain cross-sectional 
variation of portfolio returns.  Table 4 Panel B shows the 36-month predicted differences in 
premia on extreme portfolios by FF 3-Factor model.  The pseudo R-square increases on the 














































Figure 2C.  The Difference of Rolling 36mo Alphas on Extreme avtt Portfolios
36mo Moving Avg































































































Table 4 Panel A.  36mo CAPM Predicted Differences in Premia on Extreme Portfolios 
  
   
Date Range 
   Portfolio Stat 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 Δ𝑎𝑏 0.50 0.24 0.67 1.70 -0.37 -1.53 0.34 -0.56 1.61 
small-big Δr  0.24 0.13 0.31 0.37 -0.03 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.22 
 𝑅2  0.17 0.00 0.20 0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 Δ𝑎𝑏 0.46 0.91 0.16 0.91 2.29 -0.07 0.62 0.13 1.46 
high-low Δr  0.23 -0.01 0.40 0.26 -0.39 -0.20 -0.05 -0.13 0.39 
 𝑅2  0.22 -0.03 0.28 -0.02 0.08 -0.30 -0.02 0.08 -0.05 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 Δ𝑎𝑏 1.17 1.28 1.10 2.11 0.79 1.12 1.19 2.55 0.15 
up-down Δr  -0.05 -0.04 -0.06 0.25 -0.13 -0.01 0.16 0.01 -0.48 
 𝑅2  0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.02 -0.16 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 Δ𝑎𝑏 0.15 0.00 0.25 1.04 0.19 -0.97 -0.19 -1.23 0.94 
least-most Δr  -0.01 0.06 -0.05 0.24 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 -0.11 0.24 
 𝑅2  -0.07 -0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.05 -0.12 0.02 0.05 -0.03 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 Δ𝑎𝑏 0.10 0.15 0.06 1.11 0.40 -0.71 -0.10 -0.95 0.97 
least-most Δr  -0.05 -0.01 -0.08 0.21 -0.04 0.01 -0.17 -0.22 0.11 
 𝑅2  -0.05 0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.08 -0.13 0.09 0.11 0.06 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 Δ𝑎𝑏 0.16 0.13 0.17 1.15 0.40 -0.85 -0.05 -1.02 1.00 
least-most Δr  0.03 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.11 0.24 
 𝑅2  -0.06 0.00 -0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.15 0.02 0.06 -0.03 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 Δ𝑎𝑏 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.50 0.76 0.32 -0.32 -0.63 0.58 
least-most Δr  -0.31 -0.34 -0.29 -0.18 -0.09 -0.17 -0.79 -0.81 -0.08 
 𝑅2  0.39 0.37 0.41 0.08 0.14 0.27 0.33 0.38 0.43 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.31 -0.40 -0.24 0.35 -0.10 -0.24 -0.56 -2.01 0.07 
least-most Δr  -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.48 -0.49 0.13 
 𝑅2  0.17 0.17 0.18 -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.22 0.10 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 0.54 -0.06 -0.15 -0.33 -1.44 0.32 
least-most Δr  -0.06 -0.14 0.00 -0.28 0.05 -0.04 -0.38 -0.46 0.20 
 𝑅2  0.17 0.22 0.14 0.26 -0.02 0.05 0.24 0.33 0.11 
𝑠𝑝 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 na na 0.28 0.16 -0.86 0.63 
least-most Δr  -0.24 -0.23 -0.24 na na -0.22 -0.55 -0.11 -0.05 
 𝑅2  0.39 0.23 0.50 na na 0.22 0.24 0.14 0.34 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.06 -0.41 0.47 na na -1.13 -0.33 -1.10 0.31 
least-most Δr  0.16 0.09 0.26 na na -0.14 -0.39 0.14 0.52 
 𝑅2  -0.06 0.00 -0.10 na na 0.25 0.17 0.08 -0.37 
Notes: Statistics by the CAPM are reported in percentages except 𝑅2  (the pseudo R-square).  Δ𝑎𝑏 is 
the difference of abnormal returns between extreme portfolios.  Δ𝑟 is the difference of predicted 
returns between extreme portfolios.  𝑅2 = 1 − [ (Δ𝑎𝑏)2  (Δ𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑤
2 )] .  Δ𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑤
2  denotes the difference 
of abnormal returns from the random walk model.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .05 are in shaded gray 
cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold in shaded gray cells.  “least-most” denotes for the 
difference of the least and most liquid portfolios in term of abnormal or predicted returns. 
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abnormal returns is negative and significant at 5% level for all liquidity portfolios 
except 𝑠𝑝.  This means, the FF 3-Factor model also leaves part of the returns unexplained.  
The predicted difference in premia on extreme portfolios (𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑞) is positive 
(between .32% and 1.32%) and significant at 1% level in the periods of 1976-2006, 1976-
1980, and 1981-1985.  The predicted difference in premia on the same extreme portfolio 
becomes negative (between -.82% and -.86%) and significant at 1% level from 1986 to 
1990.  In the period of 1991-1995, the predicted differences in premium for 𝑎𝑣𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑞 
extreme portfolios change to positive, which are .37% and .32%, and significant at 5% 
level.  In the period of 2001-2006, the predicted difference in premia on 
𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑖𝑙𝑞 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑠𝑝 extreme portfolios is positive (between .89% and 1.41%) and 
significant at 1% level.  Although the predicted difference in liquidity premium declines in 
the period of 1986-1990, it is still positive from 2001 to 2006.   
Table 4 Panel C shows the 36-month predicted difference in premia on extreme 
portfolios by the FF 4-Factor model.  The predicted difference in abnormal returns on the 
momentum extreme portfolios is insignificant.  The Momentum factor explains momentum 
portfolios well.  However, the predicted difference in abnormal returns on some of the 
liquidity extreme portfolios is significant at 5% level.  The FF 4-Factor model still has the 
predicted pricing error.  The predicted difference in premia on extreme portfolios 
(𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑞) has similar patterns as that in Table 4 Panel B.  It is positive (between 
.29% and 1.17%) and significant at 1% level in the periods of 1976-2006, 1976-1980, and 
1981-1985.  The predicted difference in premia on these extreme portfolios becomes 
negative (between -.78% and -.85%) and significant at 1% level from 1986 to 1990.  For 
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Table 4 Panel B.  36mo FF 3 Factor Predicted Differences in Premia on Extreme Portfolios 
  
   
Date Range 
   Portfolio Stat 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.02 -0.14 0.06 0.19 -0.83 -0.50 -0.13 -0.07 0.40 
small-big Δr  0.76 0.51 0.92 1.87 0.44 -0.99 0.55 -0.38 1.42 
 𝑅2  0.83 0.81 0.83 0.90 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.84 0.73 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.20 -0.13 -0.24 -0.15 0.29 -0.13 -0.62 -0.13 -0.07 
high-low Δr  0.89 1.02 0.80 1.32 1.61 -0.14 1.18 0.13 1.92 
 𝑅2  0.79 0.64 0.83 0.81 0.70 0.31 0.55 0.59 0.72 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 Δ𝑎𝑏 1.25 1.40 1.14 1.78 1.87 0.69 1.78 3.19 -0.49 
up-down Δr  -0.12 -0.17 -0.09 0.58 -1.22 0.43 -0.43 -0.62 0.16 
 𝑅2  -0.01 -0.09 0.02 -0.05 -0.10 -0.44 -0.26 0.16 -0.21 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.07 -0.41 0.17 -0.02 -0.76 -0.06 -0.63 -1.30 0.16 
least-most  Δr  0.20 0.47 0.02 1.30 0.93 -0.87 0.37 -0.04 1.03 
 𝑅2  0.13 0.75 -0.06 0.82 0.75 0.90 0.81 0.58 0.76 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.07 -0.19 0.02 0.22 -0.30 0.12 -0.51 -0.93 0.19 
least-most Δr  0.11 0.32 -0.03 1.10 0.66 -0.82 0.23 -0.24 0.90 
 𝑅2  0.15 0.80 -0.09 0.80 0.84 0.86 0.80 0.75 0.80 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.05 -0.27 0.10 0.09 -0.56 0.06 -0.43 -1.09 0.21 
least-most Δr  0.23 0.47 0.07 1.32 0.98 -0.86 0.32 -0.05 1.03 
 𝑅2  0.14 0.75 -0.05 0.82 0.70 0.89 0.84 0.61 0.75 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 Δ𝑎𝑏 0.09 -0.20 0.28 0.42 0.38 0.35 -0.71 -1.34 -0.27 
least-most Δr  -0.22 0.07 -0.41 -0.09 0.28 -0.20 -0.40 -0.11 0.77 
 𝑅2  0.56 0.65 0.51 -0.06 0.30 0.32 0.50 0.76 0.72 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.30 -0.62 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.97 -2.25 -0.44 
least-most Δr  -0.09 0.09 -0.21 0.42 -0.03 -0.27 -0.07 -0.25 0.65 
 𝑅2  0.27 0.39 0.21 0.00 0.14 -0.05 0.33 0.48 0.45 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.19 -0.39 -0.06 0.32 0.03 0.27 -0.72 -1.85 -0.36 
least-most Δr  -0.05 0.08 -0.13 -0.07 -0.04 -0.46 0.01 -0.05 0.89 
 𝑅2  0.32 0.41 0.27 0.10 -0.04 0.34 0.31 0.52 0.51 
𝑠𝑝 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.06 -0.14 -0.01 na na 1.33 -0.15 -0.81 -0.07 
least-most Δr  -0.19 -0.04 -0.28 na na -1.27 -0.23 -0.16 0.64 
 𝑅2  0.43 0.47 0.40 na na 0.19 0.18 0.48 0.61 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.20 -0.69 0.51 na na 0.55 -0.85 -1.15 -0.58 
least-most Δr  0.30 0.36 0.22 na na -1.81 0.13 0.19 1.41 
 𝑅2  0.05 0.46 -0.21 na na 0.28 0.37 0.58 0.32 
Notes: Statistics by FF 3-Factor are reported in percentages except 𝑅2  (the pseudo R-square).  Δ𝑎𝑏 
is the difference of abnormal returns between extreme portfolios.  Δ𝑟 is the difference of predicted 
returns between extreme portfolios.  𝑅2 = 1 − [ (Δ𝑎𝑏)2  (Δ𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑤
2 )] .  Δ𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑤
2  denotes the difference 
of abnormal returns from the random walk model.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .05 are in shaded gray 
cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold in shaded gray cells.  “least-most” denotes for the 
difference of the least and most liquid portfolios in term of abnormal or predicted returns.   
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Table 4  Panel C.  36mo FF 4 Factor Predicted Differences in Premia on Extreme Portfolios 
  
   
Date Range 
   Portfolio Stat 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 Δ𝑎𝑏 0.06 -0.14 0.20 0.16 -0.92 -0.45 -0.24 0.00 0.48 
small-big Δr  0.67 0.51 0.78 1.91 0.52 -1.04 0.66 -0.46 1.34 
 𝑅2  0.84 0.80 0.85 0.91 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.83 0.69 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.14 -0.12 -0.15 -0.33 0.06 -0.25 -0.43 0.16 0.01 
high-low Δr  0.83 1.01 0.71 1.50 1.83 -0.02 1.00 -0.16 1.85 
 𝑅2  0.79 0.64 0.82 0.79 0.72 0.22 0.54 0.60 0.74 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.13 -0.22 -0.07 -0.30 -0.46 0.04 0.05 0.31 -0.87 
up-down Δr  1.25 1.46 1.12 2.66 1.12 1.08 1.30 2.25 0.54 
 𝑅2  0.80 0.80 0.80 0.91 0.73 0.77 0.69 0.89 0.73 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 Δ𝑎𝑏 0.03 -0.27 0.23 0.15 -0.40 -0.08 -0.54 -1.05 0.18 
least-most Δr  0.11 0.33 -0.04 1.13 0.58 -0.85 0.28 -0.29 1.00 
 𝑅2  0.09 0.80 -0.14 0.84 0.86 0.90 0.83 0.67 0.82 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.04 -0.16 0.03 0.28 -0.16 0.07 -0.48 -0.87 0.17 
least-most Δr  0.09 0.29 -0.05 1.05 0.52 -0.78 0.20 -0.30 0.92 
 𝑅2  0.11 0.80 -0.15 0.80 0.85 0.87 0.79 0.75 0.80 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 Δ𝑎𝑏 0.03 -0.16 0.15 0.24 -0.24 0.04 -0.38 -0.92 0.22 
least-most Δr  0.16 0.36 0.02 1.17 0.65 -0.84 0.26 -0.22 1.01 
 𝑅2  0.07 0.79 -0.15 0.83 0.81 0.89 0.84 0.66 0.80 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 Δ𝑎𝑏 0.27 -0.10 0.51 0.88 0.51 0.23 -0.66 -1.09 -0.38 
least-most Δr  -0.40 -0.04 -0.64 -0.55 0.15 -0.09 -0.45 -0.36 0.87 
 𝑅2  0.54 0.64 0.48 -0.12 0.25 0.35 0.47 0.76 0.69 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.17 -0.59 0.11 0.22 -0.11 -0.29 -0.77 -2.22 -0.41 
least-most Δr  -0.21 0.07 -0.40 0.17 0.04 0.04 -0.27 -0.28 0.61 
 𝑅2  0.23 0.38 0.15 0.04 0.14 -0.04 0.35 0.45 0.46 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.03 -0.27 0.12 0.80 0.18 0.06 -0.56 -1.72 -0.35 
least-most Δr  -0.20 -0.04 -0.31 -0.54 -0.20 -0.25 -0.14 -0.18 0.87 
 𝑅2  0.31 0.41 0.26 0.15 -0.03 0.34 0.31 0.53 0.52 
𝑠𝑝 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.17 -0.23 -0.14 na na 0.63 -0.20 -0.63 -0.22 
least-most Δr  -0.08 0.05 -0.15 na na -0.57 -0.19 -0.33 0.80 
 𝑅2  0.41 0.47 0.37 na na 0.30 0.12 0.47 0.64 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.12 -0.50 0.45 na na 0.22 -0.95 -0.41 -0.45 
least-most Δr  0.22 0.18 0.28 na na -1.48 0.24 -0.54 1.28 
 𝑅2  0.08 0.59 -0.26 na na 0.32 0.34 0.70 0.62 
Notes: Statistics by FF 4-Factor are reported in percentages except 𝑅2  (the pseudo R-square).  Δ𝑎𝑏 
is the difference of abnormal returns between extreme portfolios.  Δ𝑟 is the difference of predicted 
returns between extreme portfolios.  𝑅2 = 1 − [ (Δ𝑎𝑏)2  (Δ𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑤
2 )] .  Δ𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑤
2  denotes the difference 
of abnormal returns from the random walk model.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .05 are in shaded gray 
cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold in shaded gray cells.  “least-most” denotes for the 
difference of the least and most liquid portfolios in term of abnormal or predicted returns.   
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the extreme portfolios (𝑠𝑕𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡), the predicted difference in premia is negative (-.64 
and -.40, respectively) at 5 % significance level.  In the period of 2001-2006, the predicted 
difference in premia on 𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑖𝑙𝑞, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑠𝑝, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑠𝑝 extreme portfolios is positive and 
significant at 1% level.  This, again, indicates that the predicted returns on the least liquid 
portfolios are higher than those on the most liquid portfolios in the period of 2001-2006.   
Table 4 Panel D reports the 36-month predicted difference in premia on extreme 
portfolios by the FF 3+𝑎𝑣𝑡 Factor model.  The pseudo R-square improves on the liquidity 
extreme portfolios.  The predicted difference in abnormal returns on some of the liquidity 
extreme portfolios is significant at 5% level.  The FF 3+𝑎𝑣𝑡 Factor model cannot fully 
capture the return variations of liquidity portfolios.  A similar pattern exists as that in Table 
4 Panels C and D. The predicted difference in premia on 𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑙𝑞 extreme 
portfolios is positive (between .21% and 1.2%) and significant at 1% level in the periods of 
1976-2006, 1976-1980, and 1981-1985.  Then it becomes negative (between -.84% and -
.86%) and significant at 1% level from 1986 to 1990.  In the period of 2001-2006, the 
predicted difference in premia on 𝑎𝑣𝑡,𝑎𝑚𝑣, 𝑖𝑙𝑞, 𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡, 𝑠𝑝,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟𝑠𝑝 extreme portfolios is 
positive (between .71% and 1.40%) and significant at 5% level.   
The results from Tables 3 and 4 using either the fixed sample period or rolling 36- 
month sample confirm that the estimated/predicted premium on the least liquid portfolios 
is greater than that on the most liquid portfolios.  If transaction costs decline, the liquidity 
premium should decrease as well.  However, the results are not justified by the liquidity 
adjusted CAPM.  The positive premium is probably generated by the size and book-to-
market factors, rather than the liquidity factor constructed by the liquidity measures.  It is 
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Table 4 Panel D.  36mo FF 3+ 𝑎𝑣𝑡 Predicted Differences in Premia on Extreme Portfolios 
  
   
Date Range 
   
Portfolio 
Sta
t 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.02 -0.13 0.06 0.23 -0.89 -0.52 -0.08 -0.06 0.41 
small-big Δr  0.76 0.51 0.92 1.83 0.49 -0.97 0.50 -0.40 1.42 
 𝑅2  0.83 0.81 0.84 0.89 0.79 0.78 0.76 0.84 0.72 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.19 -0.13 -0.23 -0.11 0.17 -0.07 -0.71 -0.11 -0.05 
high-low Δr  0.88 1.03 0.79 1.28 1.72 -0.20 1.28 0.11 1.90 
 𝑅2  0.78 0.63 0.82 0.81 0.70 0.28 0.53 0.56 0.71 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 Δ𝑎𝑏 1.23 1.22 1.23 1.80 1.18 0.64 1.45 3.13 -0.50 
up-down Δr  -0.10 0.01 -0.18 0.56 -0.53 0.48 -0.10 -0.56 0.17 
 𝑅2  -0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.22 -0.47 -0.22 0.12 -0.27 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.07 -0.31 0.09 0.13 -0.58 -0.07 -0.49 -1.19 0.22 
least-most Δr  0.21 0.37 0.11 1.15 0.76 -0.86 0.24 -0.15 0.96 
 𝑅2  0.43 0.77 0.32 0.82 0.83 0.89 0.85 0.61 0.77 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 0.43 -0.21 0.11 -0.36 -0.78 0.26 
least-most Δr  0.12 0.21 0.05 0.90 0.57 -0.81 0.09 -0.39 0.82 
 𝑅2  0.46 0.81 0.32 0.75 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.80 0.82 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.05 -0.18 0.04 0.22 -0.39 0.04 -0.29 -0.99 0.27 
least-most Δr  0.24 0.38 0.14 1.20 0.81 -0.84 0.18 -0.15 0.97 
 𝑅2  0.40 0.77 0.29 0.83 0.79 0.88 0.87 0.64 0.76 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 Δ𝑎𝑏 0.11 -0.02 0.20 0.61 0.48 0.26 -0.39 -0.94 -0.12 
least-most Δr  -0.25 -0.12 -0.34 -0.29 0.18 -0.11 -0.72 -0.51 0.61 
 𝑅2  0.64 0.69 0.61 0.05 0.25 0.42 0.56 0.80 0.75 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.30 -0.44 -0.21 0.10 0.02 -0.11 -0.63 -1.77 -0.26 
least-most Δr  -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.30 -0.09 -0.14 -0.41 -0.73 0.47 
 𝑅2  0.50 0.51 0.50 -0.02 0.14 0.22 0.44 0.61 0.56 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 0.66 0.31 0.20 -0.42 -1.45 -0.19 
least-most Δr  -0.08 -0.16 -0.03 -0.40 -0.32 -0.39 -0.29 -0.45 0.71 
 𝑅2  0.49 0.49 0.49 -0.06 -0.02 0.36 0.44 0.65 0.63 
𝑠𝑝 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.11 -0.13 -0.09 na na 1.42 -0.15 -0.84 -0.06 
least-most Δr  -0.14 -0.05 -0.20 na na -1.35 -0.23 -0.13 0.64 
 𝑅2  0.49 0.44 0.52 na na 0.13 0.16 0.46 0.60 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 Δ𝑎𝑏 -0.30 -0.63 0.18 na na 0.58 -0.69 -1.13 -0.56 
least-most Δr  0.40 0.30 0.55 na na -1.85 -0.03 0.17 1.40 
 𝑅2  0.39 0.45 0.35 na na 0.31 0.39 0.56 0.30 
Notes: Statistics by FF 3+avt are reported in percentages except 𝑅2  (the pseudo R-square).  Δ𝑎𝑏 is 
the difference of abnormal returns between extreme portfolios.  Δ𝑟 is the difference of predicted 
returns between extreme portfolios.  𝑅2 = 1 − [ (Δ𝑎𝑏)2  (Δ𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑤
2 )] .  Δ𝑎𝑏𝑟𝑤
2  denotes the difference 
of abnormal returns from the random walk model.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .05 are in shaded gray 
cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold in shaded gray cells.  “least-most” denotes for the 
difference of the least and most liquid portfolios in term of abnormal or predicted returns.   
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necessary to check whether the difference of the factor loading (the market, size, and book-
to market betas) on the extreme liquidity portfolios is significant different from zero.   
Table 5 Panel A reports rolling 36-month market beta estimates from the FF 4-
Factor model on the extreme portfolios.  As expected, there is not much variation of the 
market betas on the extreme portfolios.  The difference of market betas on book-to-market 
extreme portfolios is significant in all nine sample periods.  Table 5 Panel B reports rolling 
36-month size betas from the FF 4-Factor model on extreme portfolios.  Except few, most of 
the difference of size betas on extreme portfolios is significant at 5% level.  The rolling 36-
month betas for book-to-market from the FF 4-Factor model are reported in Table 5 Panel 
C.  Except few, most of the difference of book-to-market betas on extreme portfolios is 
significant at 5% level in nine periods.  Table 5 Panel D shows rolling 36-month momentum 
betas from FF 4-Factor model.  The difference of momentum betas on extreme portfolios is 
not significant on most extreme portfolios in nine sample periods.  The difference of 
momentum betas on momentum portfolios is significant in nine periods, while it is 
significant on few liquidity, size, and book-to-market portfolios in some periods.   
Figure 3 shows the size and book-to-market betas on extreme Amihud illiquidity 𝑖𝑙𝑞 
portfolios.  The difference of size betas on extreme portfolios is larger than that of book-to-
market betas on the extreme portfolios.  The variations of these two betas, and the size and 
book-to-market factors probably are the sources of the positive liquidity premium on 




Table 5  Panel A.  36 mo Market Beta (𝑏) from the FF4 Factor Model 
     
Date Range 
   Portfolio Estimate 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 𝑏𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙  0.90 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.98 0.86 0.93 0.91 
small-big 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑔  0.97 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.88 0.94 
 
Δb -0.07 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.03 -0.11 0.05 -0.02 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑕𝑖𝑔𝑕  1.10 1.12 1.09 1.19 1.09 1.05 1.23 0.98 1.15 
high-low 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑤  1.01 0.96 1.04 1.06 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.88 0.88 
 
Δb 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.05 0.24 0.11 0.27 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 𝑏𝑢𝑝  1.11 1.13 1.10 1.12 1.09 0.98 1.27 0.99 1.29 
up-down 𝑏𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛  1.12 1.15 1.09 1.20 1.03 1.11 1.33 1.18 1.08 
 
Δb 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.06 -0.13 -0.05 -0.19 0.21 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.77 0.88 0.69 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.80 0.83 0.89 
least-most 𝑏𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.98 0.94 1.01 0.97 0.94 0.93 0.97 0.89 0.94 
 
Δb -0.22 -0.06 -0.32 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.17 -0.05 -0.06 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.76 0.82 0.71 0.88 0.90 0.83 0.72 0.78 0.83 
least-most 𝑏𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.98 0.94 1.01 0.97 0.93 0.94 0.98 0.89 0.95 
 
Δb -0.23 -0.12 -0.30 -0.09 -0.04 -0.11 -0.26 -0.10 -0.12 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.80 0.90 0.73 0.97 1.00 0.90 0.80 0.84 0.89 
least-most 𝑏𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.98 0.95 1.01 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.89 0.94 
 
Δb -0.18 -0.04 -0.27 -0.01 0.05 -0.04 -0.17 -0.05 -0.05 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.83 0.86 0.81 0.99 0.99 0.86 0.73 0.81 0.79 
least-most 𝑏𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  1.22 1.19 1.24 1.19 1.11 0.93 1.36 1.06 1.44 
 
Δb -0.39 -0.33 -0.43 -0.20 -0.12 -0.08 -0.64 -0.25 -0.65 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.88 0.93 0.85 1.01 0.99 0.87 0.81 0.91 1.00 
least-most 𝑏𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  1.09 1.06 1.11 1.08 0.96 0.86 1.17 0.98 1.28 
 
Δb -0.21 -0.13 -0.26 -0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.37 -0.07 -0.28 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.89 0.88 0.89 0.83 0.91 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.97 
least-most 𝑏𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  1.09 1.08 1.09 1.12 1.00 0.91 1.17 0.99 1.27 
 
Δb -0.20 -0.21 -0.20 -0.29 -0.09 -0.08 -0.33 -0.14 -0.30 
𝑠𝑝 𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.80 0.87 0.76 na na 0.86 0.73 0.94 0.92 
least-most 𝑏𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  1.07 1.13 1.03 na na 1.19 1.29 0.89 1.18 
 
Δb -0.27 -0.26 -0.27 na na -0.33 -0.56 0.05 -0.25 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.84 0.96 0.65 na na 0.84 0.82 0.99 1.10 
least-most 𝑏𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  1.02 1.04 1.00 na na 1.03 1.24 0.89 0.99 
 
Δb -0.19 -0.07 -0.35 na na -0.19 -0.42 0.11 0.11 
Notes: Statistics with p-value ≤ .05 are in shaded gray cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold 
in shaded gray cells.  Names of liquidity measures are in italics - refer to Appendix for definitions.  
𝑚𝑣𝑒, 𝑏𝑚𝑒, and 𝑚𝑜𝑚 denote size, book-to-market, and momentum variables, respectively.  Sample 
or sub-sample periods are short hand expressed by removing the first two digits of years.  “least-
most” denotes for the difference of the least and most liquid portfolios in term of factor loadings.   
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Table 5  Panel B.  36 mo Size Beta (𝑠) from the FF4 Factor Model 
     
Date Range 
   Portfolio Estimat 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙  1.48 1.32 1.60 1.41 1.42 1.16 1.50 1.19 1.25 
small-big 𝑠𝑏𝑖𝑔  -0.24 -0.30 -0.20 -0.24 -0.39 -0.34 -0.27 -0.29 -0.25 
 
Δs 1.72 1.61 1.80 1.64 1.81 1.50 1.78 1.48 1.50 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑕𝑖𝑔𝑕  0.50 0.52 0.49 0.76 0.53 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.64 
high-low 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑤  -0.01 -0.07 0.03 -0.10 0.26 -0.03 -0.05 -0.25 -0.26 
 
Δs 0.51 0.60 0.45 0.86 0.26 0.42 0.46 0.65 0.90 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 𝑠𝑢𝑝  0.46 0.53 0.41 0.60 0.52 0.37 0.73 0.42 0.57 
up-down 𝑠𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛  0.37 0.34 0.39 0.23 0.31 0.31 0.44 0.59 0.16 
 
Δs 0.09 0.20 0.02 0.37 0.21 0.05 0.29 -0.17 0.40 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.76 0.91 0.67 0.85 1.10 1.02 0.91 0.89 0.72 
least-most 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.22 -0.28 -0.19 -0.24 -0.39 -0.32 -0.25 -0.26 -0.21 
 
Δs 0.99 1.18 0.85 1.08 1.49 1.34 1.16 1.15 0.93 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.55 0.78 0.40 0.73 0.99 0.91 0.75 0.79 0.56 
least-most 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.20 -0.28 -0.16 -0.22 -0.36 -0.33 -0.24 -0.28 -0.23 
 
Δs 0.76 1.06 0.56 0.95 1.36 1.24 0.99 1.06 0.79 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.77 0.91 0.68 0.86 1.05 1.05 0.91 0.91 0.71 
least-most 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.22 -0.28 -0.18 -0.24 -0.38 -0.33 -0.25 -0.26 -0.21 
 
Δs 0.99 1.18 0.86 1.09 1.43 1.37 1.16 1.17 0.92 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.11 0.46 -0.13 0.63 0.76 0.54 0.29 0.52 0.08 
least-most 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.60 0.46 0.69 0.50 0.47 0.32 0.76 0.29 0.44 
 
Δs -0.49 -0.01 -0.81 0.13 0.29 0.22 -0.47 0.23 -0.36 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.17 0.55 -0.08 0.66 0.81 0.59 0.34 0.48 0.42 
least-most 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.44 0.29 0.55 0.24 0.37 0.10 0.49 0.17 0.36 
 
Δs -0.27 0.26 -0.63 0.42 0.44 0.49 -0.14 0.31 0.06 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.14 0.50 -0.11 0.27 0.04 0.79 0.54 0.72 0.60 
least-most 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.37 0.21 0.48 0.13 0.25 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.32 
 
Δs -0.23 0.29 -0.59 0.14 -0.21 0.67 0.24 0.63 0.28 
𝑠𝑝 𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.26 0.45 0.15 na na 0.84 0.63 0.37 0.23 
least-most 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.23 0.22 0.24 na na 0.38 0.61 -0.04 0.05 
 
Δs 0.03 0.23 -0.09 na na 0.46 0.02 0.41 0.18 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 𝑠𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.64 0.86 0.32 na na 1.02 1.00 0.88 0.67 
least-most 𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.03 0.02 -0.10 na na 0.36 0.31 -0.24 -0.12 
 
Δs 0.67 0.84 0.42 na na 0.66 0.69 1.12 0.78 
Notes:  Statistics with p-value ≤ .05 are in shaded gray cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold 
in shaded gray cells.  Names of liquidity measures are in italics - refer to Appendix for definitions.  
𝑚𝑣𝑒, 𝑏𝑚𝑒, and 𝑚𝑜𝑚 denote size, book-to-market, and momentum variables, respectively.  Sample 
or sub-sample periods are short hand expressed by removing the first two digits of years.  “least-
most” denotes for the difference of the least and most liquid portfolios in term of factor loadings.   
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Table 5  Panel C.  36 mo Book-to-Market Beta (𝑕) from the FF4 Factor Model 
     
Date Range 
   Portfolio Estimate 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 𝑕𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙  0.49 0.18 0.70 0.37 0.00 0.21 0.39 0.00 0.14 
small-big 𝑕𝑏𝑖𝑔  -0.09 -0.13 -0.07 -0.13 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.22 -0.20 
 
Δh 0.58 0.31 0.77 0.50 0.03 0.28 0.48 0.23 0.34 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 𝑕𝑕𝑖𝑔𝑕  0.97 0.69 1.15 0.91 0.53 0.62 1.03 0.27 0.77 
high-low 𝑕𝑙𝑜𝑤  -0.49 -0.67 -0.38 -0.63 -0.84 -0.70 -0.69 -0.64 -0.53 
 
Δh 1.46 1.36 1.53 1.54 1.36 1.31 1.72 0.91 1.30 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 𝑕𝑢𝑝  -0.04 -0.35 0.16 0.03 -0.22 -0.45 -0.34 -0.88 -0.25 
up-down 𝑕𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛  -0.03 -0.19 0.08 -0.16 -0.22 -0.06 0.01 -0.29 -0.38 
 
Δh -0.01 -0.16 0.09 0.20 0.00 -0.40 -0.35 -0.59 0.13 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 𝑕𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.34 0.26 0.39 0.39 0.20 0.06 0.27 0.30 0.32 
least-most 𝑕𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.09 -0.15 -0.06 -0.16 -0.02 -0.07 -0.10 -0.28 -0.22 
 
Δh 0.43 0.40 0.45 0.55 0.23 0.13 0.37 0.58 0.54 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 𝑕𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.23 0.27 0.19 0.36 0.22 0.10 0.30 0.35 0.30 
least-most 𝑕𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.05 -0.12 0.00 -0.12 0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.29 -0.22 
 
Δh 0.27 0.40 0.19 0.48 0.19 0.14 0.38 0.64 0.53 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 𝑕𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.38 0.26 0.45 0.39 0.26 0.06 0.19 0.31 0.35 
least-most 𝑕𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.09 -0.15 -0.06 -0.15 -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 -0.28 -0.22 
 
Δh 0.47 0.41 0.51 0.54 0.27 0.15 0.29 0.60 0.57 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 𝑕𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.02 0.19 -0.10 -0.19 -0.07 0.31 0.16 0.50 0.41 
least-most 𝑕𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.18 -0.60 0.10 -0.18 -0.36 -0.51 -0.54 -1.23 -0.76 
 
Δh 0.20 0.80 -0.20 -0.01 0.29 0.82 0.69 1.74 1.18 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 𝑕𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  -0.01 0.09 -0.08 -0.21 -0.09 0.12 0.26 0.30 0.18 
least-most 𝑕𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.14 -0.42 0.06 -0.16 -0.08 -0.27 -0.28 -1.00 -0.67 
 
Δh 0.13 0.51 -0.13 -0.05 -0.01 0.39 0.54 1.30 0.85 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 𝑕𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.05 0.18 -0.04 0.19 0.01 0.17 0.24 0.24 0.22 
least-most 𝑕𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.11 -0.42 0.10 -0.14 -0.10 -0.38 -0.25 -0.98 -0.64 
 
Δh 0.16 0.60 -0.14 0.33 0.11 0.55 0.49 1.22 0.86 
𝑠𝑝 𝑕𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.04 0.12 -0.01 na na 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.20 
least-most 𝑕𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.13 -0.57 0.14 na na -0.64 -0.26 -0.69 -0.73 
 
Δh 0.18 0.70 -0.14 na na 0.75 0.37 0.74 0.92 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 𝑕𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.31 0.24 0.41 na na 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.48 
least-most 𝑕𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.39 -0.59 -0.10 na na -1.19 -0.57 -0.37 -0.61 
 
Δh 0.70 0.83 0.51 na na 1.28 0.67 0.50 1.09 
Notes:  Statistics with p-value ≤ .05 are in shaded gray cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold 
in shaded gray cells.  Names of liquidity measures are in italics - refer to Appendix for definitions.  
𝑚𝑣𝑒, 𝑏𝑚𝑒, and 𝑚𝑜𝑚 denote size, book-to-market, and momentum variables, respectively.  Sample 
or sub-sample periods are short hand expressed by removing the first two digits of years.  “least-
most” denotes for the difference of the least and most liquid portfolios in term of factor loadings.   
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Table 5  Panel D.  36 mo Momentum Beta (𝑚) from the FF4 Factor Model 
 
  
   
Date Range 
   Portfolio Estimate 30-06 76-06 30-75 76-80 81-85 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 
𝑚𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙  -0.10 -0.03 -0.15 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.06 -0.15 
small-big 𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑔  0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 
 Δm -0.10 -0.03 -0.15 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.06 -0.09 -0.11 
𝑏𝑚𝑒 𝑚𝑕𝑖𝑔𝑕  -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.17 -0.02 -0.16 
high-low 𝑚𝑙𝑜𝑤  0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.11 -0.16 0.02 -0.03 0.10 -0.01 
 Δm -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 0.12 0.15 0.01 -0.14 -0.12 -0.16 
𝑚𝑜𝑚 𝑚𝑢𝑝  0.67 0.61 0.71 0.81 0.64 0.58 0.56 0.70 0.43 
up-down 𝑚𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛  -0.84 -0.93 -0.78 -0.88 -0.86 -0.87 -1.03 -1.11 -0.84 
 Δm 1.51 1.54 1.49 1.69 1.50 1.45 1.58 1.81 1.27 
𝑎𝑣𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.18 0.01 -0.10 -0.06 -0.07 
least-most 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 
 Δm -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.15 -0.24 0.00 -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 
𝑎𝑚𝑣 𝑚𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 
least-most 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 
 Δm -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.10 0.09 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 
𝑖𝑙𝑞 𝑚𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 -0.11 -0.16 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 
least-most 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.01 
 Δm -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.14 -0.22 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
𝑠𝑕𝑛 𝑚𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.17 0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.11 
least-most 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.22 0.15 0.27 0.52 0.15 -0.06 0.06 0.17 0.09 
 Δm -0.22 -0.14 -0.28 -0.35 -0.08 0.03 -0.03 -0.17 -0.20 
𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.02 0.05 0.01 0.18 0.08 0.08 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 
least-most 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.20 0.13 0.24 0.38 0.04 -0.06 0.09 0.15 0.17 
 Δm -0.17 -0.08 -0.24 -0.20 0.04 0.14 -0.14 -0.11 -0.19 
𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡 𝑚𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.02 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 
least-most 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.20 0.13 0.25 0.41 0.07 -0.04 0.04 0.13 0.15 
 Δm -0.22 -0.15 -0.26 -0.40 -0.13 0.05 -0.12 -0.16 -0.17 
𝑠𝑝 𝑚𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  0.08 0.09 0.07 na na 0.13 -0.01 0.10 0.15 
least-most 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  -0.09 -0.04 -0.12 na na -0.22 -0.04 0.08 -0.07 
 Δm 0.16 0.13 0.18 na na 0.34 0.03 0.03 0.22 
𝑟𝑠𝑝 𝑚𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡  -0.10 -0.15 -0.02 na na -0.01 -0.03 -0.18 -0.29 
least-most 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑠𝑡  0.00 0.01 0.00 na na -0.17 -0.06 0.13 0.01 
 Δm -0.10 -0.16 -0.02 na na 0.17 0.03 -0.31 -0.30 
Notes:  Statistics with p-value ≤ .05 are in shaded gray cells.  Statistics with p-value ≤ .01 are bold 
in shaded gray cells.  Names of liquidity measures are in italics - refer to Appendix for definitions.  
𝑚𝑣𝑒, 𝑏𝑚𝑒, and 𝑚𝑜𝑚 denote size, book-to-market, and momentum variables, respectively.  Sample 
or sub-sample periods are short hand expressed by removing the first two digits of years.  “least-
















Figure 4.  36mo smb & hml FF4 Factor Betas on Extreme Amihud Illiquidity Portfolios
ilq - hml Beta Most Liquid (1) 
ilq - hml Beta Least Liquid (10) 
ilq - smb Beta Least Liquid (10) 




This study examines whether the liquidity premium declines as the transaction cost 
decrease.  Eleven monthly liquidity measures are computed based on daily frequency data 
from CRSP.  Nine of eleven liquidity measures are used to form liquidity deciles portfolios.  
The liquidity premium is computed based on extreme deciles portfolios.  I use five models 
(the random walk model, the capital asset pricing model, the FF 3-Factor, FF 4-Factor, and 
FF3+𝑎𝑣𝑡 Factor models) to compute the difference in estimated liquidity premia in nine 
sample periods.  I also employ the rolling 36-month sample to compute the predicted 
difference in liquidity premia on extreme portfolios based on these five models.  The 
results show that the estimated liquidity premia decline in some periods, but increase in 
the period from 2001 to 2006.  This contradicts the implication of the liquidity-adjusted 
CAPM that the liquidity premium for holding securities should decrease as the costs of 
transactions decline.   
One possible explanation is that the positive premium is probably generated by the 
size and book-to-market factors, rather than the liquidity factor constructed by the 
liquidity portfolios and liquidity measures.  As Table 5 shows, the difference of the factor 
loadings (betas) on size and book-to-market on liquidity extreme portfolios is significant in 
almost all cases.  The product of the difference of size or book-to-market beta and the 
associated factor return contributes more to the liquidity premium than the liquidity factor 
loading and its factor return.  Liquidity is highly correlated with size and book-to-market, 
rather than the constructed liquidity factor from liquidity measures.   
Lastly, I summarize and interpret the results regarding the difference of rolling 36-
month alphas (average pricing errors) on extreme liquidity portfolios from 1998 to 2001.  
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The liquidity shock in March 2000 causes the negative alphas shown in Figure 2B to 2I.  It is 
likely that people run for liquid securities, rather than illiquid securities, to respond to the 
liquidity shock.  The premium for liquid securities is higher than that for illiquid securities.  
So should the unexplained premium for liquid equities and for illiquidity equities.  
Therefore, the difference of alphas on extreme liquidity portfolios is negative in the period 
of a liquidity shock.  Incorporating investors’ sentiment with liquidity shock and liquidity 




6. Appendix: Liquidity Measures 
Monthly liquidity measures are constructed from CRSP (2006) daily data. Variables 
in computations each month include:  
𝑟𝑑 = daily total return, 𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑑 =  daily closing price (negative prices indicate datum is mid-
point quote), 𝑠𝑕𝑜 =  end of month shares outstanding (in 1,000s) , 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑 = daily volume, 
$𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑= 𝑎𝑏𝑠(𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑑)(𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑) = daily dollar volume, 𝑚𝑣𝑒 = end of month market value of 
equity (in 1,000s), 𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑑  = daily asking price,  𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑=daily bid price, 𝑛𝑡𝑑 = number of 
trading days in month, 𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑑  = 1  if trade on day 𝑑 and zero otherwise [ i.e., if 𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑑 > 0 or 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑 > 0  then  𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑑  = 1], and 𝑧𝑟𝑑 = 1 if 𝑟𝑑 = 0 on day 𝑑 and zero otherwise. 
Price impact measures 
1.  𝑎𝑣𝑡 =  $𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑   𝑟𝑑    * 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒:  The Amivest ratio measure the dollar volume changes 
that results in a 1% price change (scale=.000001).  Used by Dubofsky & Groth 
(1984); Cooper, Groth, & Avera (1985); Khan & Baker (1993).  For time series 
comparisons (𝑎𝑣𝑡𝑡), I use 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 =  1 𝑚𝑣𝑒 .  
2.  𝑎𝑚𝑣 =  𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑   𝑟𝑑   ∗ 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒:  A variant of Amivest used by Amihud(1997,2002); 
Berkman & Eleswarapu (1998) (scale=.000001). For time series 
comparisons (𝑎𝑚𝑣𝑡), I use 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 =  1 𝑠𝑕𝑜 .4 
3.  𝐼𝑙𝑞 =  𝑟𝑑  $𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑               ∗ 1𝑚𝑖𝑙: Amihud (2002) Illiquidity measures “the absolute 
(percentage) price change per dollar of daily trading volume, or the daily 
price impact of the order flow.”  For time series comparisons (𝑖𝑙𝑞𝑡), I scale the 
measure by 𝑚𝑣𝑒 instead of 1𝑚𝑖𝑙.   
                                                          
4
 This is not an exhaustive list of Amivest variants.  Hasbrouck (2005) uses two Amivest variants : 𝑎𝑣𝑡 =
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑  𝑟𝑑               ∗ 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒, and Hasbrouck (2006) 𝑎𝑣𝑡 = $𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑  𝑟𝑑                 ∗ 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒 in his research. 
127 
 
Trading frequency measures 
4.  𝑠𝑕𝑛 =  𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑕𝑜 :   Share turnover measures the number times shares outstanding 
are exchanged in a month. 
5.  𝑚𝑣𝑛 =  $𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑚𝑣𝑒 :   Market Value Turnover measures the number times the 
market value of equity is traded over a month.   
Stale price measures 
6.  𝑝𝑡𝑟𝑑 =  𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑑 𝑛𝑡𝑑 :  Proportion of days traded is number of days with valid trades 
over total trading days in month. 
7.  𝑝𝑧𝑟 =  𝑧𝑟𝑑  𝑛𝑡𝑑 :   Proportion of zero return days in month 
8.  𝑝𝑧𝑟1 =   (1 − 𝑡𝑟𝑑𝑑)(𝑧𝑟𝑑) 𝑛𝑡𝑑 :  Proportion of no-trade zero return days in month. 
Transactions cost measures 
9.  𝑠𝑝𝑡 = (𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑑 − 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑)                  : Month average bid-ask spread. 
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